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There is so much talk about music, and yet so little really said. For my part I 
believe that words do not suffice for such a purpose, and if I found they did 
suffice, then I certainly would have nothing more to do with music. People often 
complain that music is ambiguous, that their ideas on the subject always seem so 
vague, whereas every one understands words; with me it is exactly the reverse; 
not merely with regard to entire sentences, but also as to individual words; these, 
too, seem to me so ambiguous, so vague, so unintelligible when compared with 
genuine music, which fills the soul with a thousand things better than words. 
What the music I love expresses to me, is not thought too indefinite to be put into 
words, but, on the contrary, too definite.1 
 
The main aim of my thesis is negative. I want to challenge claims from Peter Kivy about so-
called  
“Absolute music,” then, as defined, is pure instrumental music without text, title, 
program, dramatic setting, or any other extra-musical apparatus. It is music, as 
defined, without representational, narrative, semantic or other extra-musical 
content.2 
Or, that it is a “quasi-syntactical structure of sound understandable solely in musical terms 
and having no semantic or representational content, no meaning, making reference to nothing 
beyond itself”.3 The essence of these, and similar claims about music, is that music does not 
have meaning. If I succeed in showing that these claims can be refuted, I will have achieved 
much. A secondary aim of this thesis will be positive. I hope to point in the direction of a 
plausible account of meaning in music. Given the space available, I do not have a full, well-
argued account of how and why there is meaning in music. Still, with the help of a few other 
philosophers of music, I have some suggestions that I would like to put forward. 
 
                                                 
1 Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, “Letter to Marc-André Souchay” in Mendelssohn’s Letters, pp. 298-300. 
2 Peter Kivy, Antithetical Arts, p. 157. 
3 Peter Kivy, Music Alone, p. 202. 
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The reason I want to challenge Kivy’s claims is that I believe that music, also of the so-called 
absolute kind, has meaning. Music can covey something about something other than itself. 
For people not partaking in the debate of whether music has meaning, this is not a 
controversial claim. However, trying to pin-point it philosophically proves difficult. As such, 
the main question that runs through my thesis will be: does music have meaning? Intuitively, 
I am prone to answer yes, and I will argue that there are good reasons to. The question of 
what counts as meaning, or how do define it is a difficult one. Both Peter Kivy, and James O. 
Young, one of his main adversaries, want to reserve the term meaning for the linguistic sense. 
If meaning is conceived like that, most people agree that music does not have meaning. There 
is another sense of meaning in play here, though, which is not trivial, even if it is not 
linguistic in nature. Through my discussion of Kivy’s opponents, I hope that this sense will 
become clear. 
 
There is implied in our culture a strong connection between music and the emotions. Both 
those who believe that such a connection is real, and those that do not, agree that this 
implication exists. As such, an exploration of what musical meaning might be, will also have 
to explore the nature of the connection between music and emotion. All theories concerning 
musical meaning (whether it is pro or contra), relies on discussions of the relation between 
music and emotion. Both Jenefer Robinson (to a degree) and Young give accounts of musical 
meaning grounded in an account of music arousing emotion. What aesthetic relevance the 
emotions have, will therefore also be a recurring theme in the thesis. Much time, then, will be 
spent discussing the relation between music and the emotions, both in Kivy, and in his 
adversaries. 
 
Another recurring theme in the thesis is a discussion of the term absolute music, i.e., 
instrumental music with no accompanying text, and with no obvious function. In the modern 
debate, absolute music is the central example among a majority of the participants, as it is 
thought to present the best case study of music. However, I will argue that the nature of the 




The structure of the work will be as follows. In the first chapter, I will set the stage for Kivy, 
by discussing some of the background for his position. I will begin by discussing absolute 
music, to show how the emergence of the term coincides with both formalism, the idea of 
musical autonomy, but also the idea of music alone having meaning. I will go on to a short 
discussion of Kant, to show how he has been an inspiration to the formalists. Then I will turn 
to Eduard Hanslick, which in the current debate is considered the original formalist. The 
central problems he dealt with are still widely contended in the philosophy of music, and his 
work still widely discussed. 
 
In the second chapter I will give an overview of Kivy’s position. I will look into his 
conception of absolute music, before I lay out his strain of formalism, enhanced formalism. 
Then, I will look specifically into what he has to say about the question of meaning in music. 
 
This will lead us to the third chapter, where I give answers to Kivy’s claims regarding the 
impossibility of meaning in music. I will use works by Jenefer Robinson, James O. Young 
and Aaron Ridley to give a criticism of Kivy’s theories from different angles. At the same 
time, I will relay their respective positive views on what constitutes meaning in music, to see 
if any of their alternatives seem plausible. 
 
In conclusion I argue that neither a purely formalist view of music, nor Kivy’s enhanced 
version are plausible, and that we would be wise considering alternatives. I will also provide a 





1 The Roots of Formalism 
Musical formalism is the view that the content of music is, in one way or another, just the 
formal aspects of music. A piece of music contains tones, rests, rhythm and similar musical 
building blocks, and nothing else. The appearance of formalistic theories about music is 
closely linked to the appearance of the idea of musical autonomy. As Andy Hamilton notes in 
Aesthetics and Music, music has not always been considered something worth pursuing on its 
own.  
From ancient times, vocal music was ranked above purely instrumental music, 
and the rhetorical or linguistic interpretation of instrumental music dated back to 
Ancient Greece. Since it now seems obvious that music is an aural phenomenon, 
and that a text – such as the lyrics of a song – is in some sense an extra-musical 
element, it is easy to overlook the fact that music, in almost all traditions, was 
once centrally vocal and dramatic. But the autonomy of music from text or 
rhetoric is an historically moulded assumption no more than two centuries old.4 
Music, for the most part of history, and apart from music as high art, even today, is either 
mostly vocal or in some sense functional. Listening to music just for the sake of listening to 
music is a relatively new activity. The etymology of the word music betrays this; music from 
ancient Greek mousike techne means the arts of the muses, i.e., the arts that were the domain 
of the muses. It originally incorporated poetry and myths as well as songs. It was not 
restricted to merely what we think of as music today, and it did probably not include a 
concept of instrumental music without accompanying text, play or dance. Throughout history, 
all the way up until the end of the 18th century, we do not find the same reverence as we do 
today of music on its own. The shift, then, that occurred in the 19th century was indeed 
profound. Today, we see the symphony, often without a single word connected to it, not even 
a title apart from the number, as something exalted in its wordlessness, not deprived of 
anything. Some hundred years ago, rhetorical analysis of music was the most common way of 
analysing it. There is nothing given about the position instrumental music has achieved, it is 
the result of a shift in the way of thinking about music, and musical formalism has its roots in 
this shift. 
 
                                                 
4 Andy Hamilton, Aesthetics and Music, p. 67. 
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1.1 A Note on Absolute Music 
 
The term absolute music has both a normative and a descriptive dimension. This is because 
the term originated as an ideal for a way of composing music. Absolute music is music for its 
own sake, not filling a function, or “helped” by an accompanying text. In other words, it is 
music without extra-musical apparatus. It is the descriptive dimension that is most used today, 
as examples of absolute music has been dominating the debates of philosophy of music the 
past 30-40 years. The reason for this, as noted in the introduction, is that music which is 
thought to be stripped of any extra-musical apparatus makes for good case studies in a lot of 
the central problems in the philosophy of music. That is, if we want to explore the possibility 
of semantics in music, for instance, it seems prudent to exclude music with words in it. 
 
The normative dimension of absolute music points to absolute music as an ideal for 
composing. As Andy Hamilton notes in Aesthetics and Music, this was not the most 
prominent ideal for music when it arose in the 19th century, with tone poems, programme 
symphonies, lieder, and the like dominating in the romantic period.  
Absolute music was, therefore, a metaphysical aspiration and not a social fact; a 
part of composers’ self-understanding, which presents a model of what they are 
trying to achieve. Indeed, as [Roger] Scruton puts it, ‘The term “absolute music” 
denotes not so much an agreed idea as an aesthetic problem.5  
Absolute music could spring forth at this moment in time because of the shift to a romantic 
aesthetic. With this shift, music was liberated from the other arts, and came to be seen as 
autonomous. Indeed, this separation of music from the other arts was so successful, that when 
the romantic paradigm of autonomous art came to the fore, music became the example for the 
other arts to follow. As Walter Pater proclaimed in the 1870s: “All art, constantly aspires to 
the condition of music”.6 Lydia Goehr argues that with the emergence of the Romantic 
aesthetic, two things happened; there was a “transcendent move from the worldly and 
                                                 
5 Andy Hamilton, Aesthetics and Music, p. 68. 
6 Walter Pater, “The School of Giorgione” in The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry, p. 86. 
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particular to the spiritual and universal”,7 and a “formalist move which brought the meaning 
from music’s outside to its inside”.8 On the back of this, Aaron Ridley observes that 
The conflation or intertwining of these two moves resulted in a highly peculiar 
position: music’s significance was now all its own, but the ‘purely musical, in 
these terms was now synonymous with the moral, the spiritual, and the infinite in 
its uniquely musical form’. Therefore ‘matters in relevant circumstances 
considered extra-musical could in other circumstances be regarded as purely 
musical’, so that theorists came to ‘accept a double-sided view of musical 
meaning, that it be transcendent, embodied spirituality and purely musical at the 
same time. In sum the new romantic aesthetic allowed music to mean its purely 
musical self at the same time that it meant everything else’. Clearly such a 
position was unstable (not to say unintelligible). But its long-term effect was to 
move the idea of the autonomous musical work to the centre of the conceptual 
stage, so that when the Romantic aesthetic finally collapsed it was the 
transcendent move that was repudiated, leaving the formalist move (which shifted 
musical meaning from the outside in) in place. By the beginning of the twentieth 
century, then, the view that pieces of music were essentially those autonomous 
structures of sound capable of being symbolically represented in scores was 
firmly entrenched.9 
As we can see, the idea of absolute music (referred to as “the purely musical” above) is 
closely tied to the emergence of romantic aesthetics. Music needed to be autonomous for 
absolute music to come forth as a term. Moreover, the idea of absolute music is closely tied to 
the emergence of formalism as well. We can see here the aesthetic problem Scruton pointed 
to; music at this point in time was supposed to be both autonomous and still able to convey 
deep, spiritual meaning. For the composers, this became an ideal to aspire to. In the end, the 
formalist part of this move was the one that was kept. But the term absolute music understood 
normatively, seems to contain both the formalist and the transcendent move, at least 
throughout the 19th and early 20th century. When the descriptive use of absolute music, then, 
is taken to be that absolute music is almost definitionally devoid of meaning, it has moved 
away from the term’s origins as normative. The meanings of words change, so there is 
nothing impermissible with using the term absolute music descriptively today, seen from this 
angle. Discussions of the term which draw on history, however, need to take the duality of the 
use of the term absolute music into account. The main point to be drawn out from this, is that 
                                                 
7 Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, p. 153. 
8 Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, p. 153. 
9 Aaron Ridley, The Philosophy of Music: Theme and Variations, p. 9. Citation within citation: Lydia Goehr, The 
Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, pp. 156-157. 
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the difference between the normative and the descriptive aspect of the term absolute music, is 
the difference between the aspiration to create music that can stand on its own, separate from 
other forms of art or expression, and the description of such works of music as devoid of 
meaning.  
 
1.2 Kant as Inspiration for Formalists 
 
While Peter Kivy does not rely much on Kant explicitly, his focus on the form of music can 
be seen to have its roots in Kant. In addition, Hanslick makes his considerations against a 
decidedly Kantian background (even though he differs from Kant in many important 
respects). Thus, to set the stage for the rise of formalism, an explication of Kant’s idea of the 
beautiful, as it pertains to the formalist, seems in order. 
For, although of course it [music, the art of tone] speaks through mere sensations 
without concepts, and hence does not, like poetry, leave behind something for 
reflection, yet it moves the mind in more manifold and, though only temporarily, 
in deeper ways; but it is, to be sure, more enjoyment than culture (the play of 
thought that is aroused by it in passing is merely the effect of an as it were 
mechanical association); and it has, judged by reason, less value than any of the 
other beautiful arts.10 
The influence Immanuel Kant has had on formalism in general, and musical formalism 
specifically, does not stem from his thoughts about music in particular, but from his aesthetics 
in general. While it is not within the scope of this thesis to give a full account of Kant’s 
aesthetic theory, or to go into critical discussion of it, I want to highlight two parts of it that 
seem to be of importance to both Kivy and Hanslick. 
 
Kant puts forward his aesthetic theory in Critique of the Power of Judgment. He makes an 
analysis of the beautiful, or of the judgment of taste, in four moments, according to his four 
categories of judgment. These four moments leads to four definitions of different aspects of 
the beautiful. Two of these definitions are of particular interest to the formalists, the definition 
                                                 
10 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, p. 205 (5:328). 
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regarding purposiveness without the representation of an end and the definition regarding 
disinterestedness. 
 
The first definition of the beautiful of interest to the formalist concludes that “Beauty is the 
form of the purposiveness of an object, insofar as it is perceived in it without representation 
of an end”.11 When judging an object as beautiful, we must pay attention to the form, and not 
the colour or charm. “Taste is always still barbaric when it needs the addition of charms and 
emotions for satisfaction, let alone if it makes these into the standard for its approval”.12 But it 
is not merely the object’s form that is to be considered, it is the object’s form of 
purposiveness without the representation of an end. 
If one would define what an end is in accordance with its transcendental 
determinations (without presupposing anything empirical, such as the feeling of 
pleasure), then an end is the object of a concept insofar as the latter is regarded as 
the cause of the former (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a 
concept with regard to its object is purposiveness (forma finalis).13 
Something is a purpose when a concept is the cause of an object. The concept is the cause of 
the end. Beauty seems to have purpose, and as such it should have an end. However, beauty 
does not have an end. This definition turns out to be paradoxical in its form. What it tries to 
capture is that the beautiful seems to be for something, and seems to be intended, while at the 
same time it is not. In a sense, beauty reaches towards something, which is, however, not an 
end. 
 
The second definition of the beautiful that formalism draws on states that the object of an 
aesthetic judgment must be something that we do not take an interest in. “Taste is the faculty 
for judging an object or a kind of representation through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
without any interest. The object of such a satisfaction is called beautiful”.14 The beautiful is 
our satisfaction in an object, or in its representation. When we have an interest in the object 
                                                 
11 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, p. 120 (5:236). 
12 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, p. 108 (5:223). 
13 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, p. 105 (5:219-220). 
14 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, p. 96 (5:211). 
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we deem beautiful, we cannot be sure if the satisfaction is a result of our judgment of the 
object as beautiful, or if it is the result of the interest we take in it. I could say that I think my 
shoes are beautiful, but the pleasure I get from them comes from the fact that they keep my 
feet safe. They may even actually be beautiful, but as long as I have this interest regarding the 
safety of my feet, I cannot make a pure judgment of taste about them. If I am able to make a 
pure judgment of taste regarding my shoes, it is because I can see beyond my own interest in 
them, and find satisfaction or dissatisfaction in them in a way that is not connected to their 
usefulness for me. In contrast; that I am able to judge a piece of music, or a work of art in 
general as beautiful, is because they have no utility. Music typically does not have 
instrumental value,15 hence I have no interest in it. My judgment of a piece of music as 
beautiful, then, is free from the notion of usefulness, and hence disinterested. 
 
If there are no interests at play in us, so that our judgment of an object (or the representation 
of it) is based purely on its pleasing or displeasing us, then this judgment holds universally. 
We must assume that everyone else, if they too are able to make a disinterested judgment of 
the object, will find the same pleasure or displeasure in it. This explains why, when we say 
“this concert was beautiful”, we do not mean “this concert was beautiful to me” in the same 
manner as we would say “this apple tastes good to me”. We make a universal claim about the 
beauty of the concert, as if the beauty were a property of it. Kant does not believe that beauty 
is in fact a property of an object, but the subjective judgment about the beauty of the concert, 
taken that the judgment is deprived of all interest, will still be a universal subjective judgment 
that everyone else will also make. 
 
The notion of a judgment that is both universal and subjective may seem to lead into trouble. 
The judgment of taste is based on our feeling of pleasure, and yet it holds universally. There 
are, however, no universal rules for this feeling of pleasure, since the beautiful pleases 
without a concept. Therefore, it must be the feeling of pleasure itself that in some way is 
capable of being universally communicated. “Nothing, however, can be universally 
                                                 
15 No pun intended. 
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communicated except cognition and representation so far as it belongs to cognition”.16 This 
means that the feeling of pleasure we experience in judging something as beautiful must be 
based on cognition or representation belonging to cognition. Cognition concerns itself with 
concepts, but when we judge something as beautiful, we do this without concepts.  
Now if the determining ground of the judgment on this universal communicability 
of the representation is to be conceived of merely subjectively, namely without a 
concept of the object, it can be nothing other than the state of mind that is 
encountered in the relation of the powers of representation to each other insofar as 
they relate a given representation to cognition in general.17 
This state of mind encountered in the relation of the powers of representation, Kant calls the 
state of free play of the faculties of cognition, or in other words, the free play between the 
imagination and the understanding. When these faculties of cognition are in free play, there 
are no determinate concepts, and this enables us to make subjective claims. Yet, since it is 
still cognition, we are able to make universal claims, even if there are no concepts involved. 
Hence, the notion of the state of free play of the faculties of cognition seems to make both the 
subjectivity and universality of a judgment of taste simultaneously possible. 
 
1.2.1 Formalist Legacy 
 
The parts of Kant’s aesthetics outlined above, shows why he has inspired formalist theories of 
art in general, and music specifically. He asks us to pay attention to the form of the object of a 
judgement of taste, and to disregard its superficial properties. As Donald W. Crawford writes 
in his entry on Kant in The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, “Ornamentation or elements 
of charm or emotion may attract us to beautiful objects, but judging them purely in terms of 
beauty requires us to abstract from these elements and reflect only on their form. To this 
extent Kant advances a formalist aesthetics”.18 Kivy also gives an account of what he calls 
Kant’s formalism. 
                                                 
16 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, p. 102 (5:217). 
17 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, p. 102 (5:217). 
18 Donald W. Crawford, “Kant” in The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, p. 60. 
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When we agree that the sunset is beautiful, if we have really achieved the attitude 
of disinterestedness towards it, it is the form of the visual appearance that we are 
talking about. Furthermore, Kant points out over and over again, we do not even 
make a commitment to the actual existence of the thing, whatever it might be, the 
form of which we judge beautiful. The form of the sunset is, after all, invariant 
with the mode of the sunset’s existence. Whether it is a real sunset, a dream sunset 
or a hallucinatory sunset makes no difference. Whatever the existential status of 
the sunset, the form of its visual appearance remains constant; and it is its form 
that we are reacting to in the pure judgment of taste. This is Kant’s ‘formalism’.19 
Kant does not undoubtedly advance a formalist aesthetic, and labelling him as one would be 
anachronistic. Different readings yield different results, but his insistence on the importance 
of the formal properties in the judgment of taste has inspired many formalists in the time after 
him. Most prominently among these, at least before the 20th century, was the Austrian music 
critic Eduard Hanslick. 
 
1.3 Hanslick’s Formalism 
 
Eduard Hanslick is something akin to a smallest common denominator for formalists. He was 
an Austrian music critic and theorist, active in the mid to late 19th century, hence situated in a 
time and place where both the classical and (in this case more importantly) the romantic 
tradition had a solid foothold. Hanslick was opposed to the romantic, metaphysical 
conception of music as a language of the feelings, and wished to have a more sober discussion 
of what the content of music is, or possibly can be, and to celebrate what is already there in 
music, instead of trying to embed something extra-musical as a part of music. Hanslick’s 
main work on the aesthetics of music (and until the middle of the 20th century, one of just a 
few works on aesthetics dedicated specifically to music) is entitled Vom Musikalisch-Schönen 
in German, variously translated to English as either On the Beautiful in Music or, more 
correctly, On the Musically Beautiful. Hanslick believes that a theory of what is aesthetically 
beautiful in the arts should treat the different arts differently, so that what is beautiful in music 
is beautiful in a different way than what is beautiful in painting or poetry. Hence, to borrow a 
point from Hamilton, the latter of the translations of the German title of the book fits better, as 
                                                 
19 Peter Kivy, Introduction to a Philosophy of Music, pp. 55-56. 
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the phrasing On the Beautiful in Music may give the impression that he has a theory of what 
beauty is in general, and that this book shows how it can be applied to music.20  
 
The book itself is relatively short, and rather polemical in its style. He opens it by setting forth 
a negative and a positive thesis. The negative is that he opposes the view that music is 
supposed to represent feeling, the view most common in Hanslick’s day.21 The positive thesis 
is that the beauty of music is specifically musical, i.e., not the result of any factors external to 
music.22 He spends the two first chapters of the book trying to refute what he terms as feeling 
theory. Hanslick gives the following account of the two main arguments of the feeling 
theorists. 
According to this doctrine [feeling theory], music cannot entertain the intellect by 
means of concepts the way literature does, any more than it can the eye, as do the 
visual arts. Hence music must have as its vocation to act upon the feelings. 
“Music has to do with the feelings,” we are told. This expression “has to do” is a 
characteristically vague utterance of previous musical aesthetics.23 
Hanslick’s reconstruction of the arguments of feeling theory does not seem to be done with an 
interest of giving his opponent a strong argument in mind. His attribution of “has to do” to his 
opposition, and then attacking it for being vague is characteristic of his style throughout the 
book. He offers to clear this “has to do” up for us, and finds two senses in which people claim 
that music “has to do” with the feelings.  
Of music in the first of these two rôles, it is claimed that to arouse the delicate 
feelings is the defining purpose of music. In the second, the feelings are 
designated as the content of music, that which musical art presents in its works. 
The two are similar in that both are false.24 
In the spirit of the last sentence, he swiftly moves on to argue against both of these claims. 
His refutation of the first seems to be based on the Kantian idea that beauty is purposiveness 
without purpose (or, the representation of an end). Since his discussion is about the musically 
                                                 
20 Andy Hamilton, Aesthetics and Music, p. 81. 
21 Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, p. xxii. 
22 Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, p. xxiii. 
23 Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, p. 3. 
24 Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, p. 3. 
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beautiful, and since he agrees with Kant that beauty can have no purpose, it follows that the 
arousal of feeling cannot be the purpose of music, since beauty can have no purpose at all. 
“Beauty is and remains beauty even if no feelings are aroused and even if it be neither 
perceived nor thought”.25 In general, then, Hanslick believes that music in no way can be 
defined from purposes, not even the arousal of feeling, even though he admits that the relation 
between music and feeling is a close one: “The fact that this art is intimately related to our 
feelings in no way supports the view that the aesthetical significance of music resides in this 
relationship”.26 
 
In preparation to his refutation of the second claim, that feelings are the content of music, he 
first makes a distinction between feeling and sensation, which again seems reminiscent of 
Kant. “Sensation is the perception of a specific sense quality: this particular tone, that 
particular colour. Feeling is becoming aware of our mental state with regard to its furtherance 
or inhibition, thus of well-being or distress”.27 Hanslick believes that feelings always have an 
aboutness or intentionality. We do not for instance have a general feeling of fear, we are 
specifically afraid of something. 
The feeling of hope cannot be separated from the representation of a future happy 
state which we compare to the present; melancholy compares past happiness with 
the present. These are entirely specific representations or concepts. Without them, 
without this cognitive apparatus, we cannot call the actual feeling “hope” or 
“melancholy”; it produces them for this purpose. If we take this away, all that 
remains is an unspecific stirring, perhaps the awareness of a general state of well-
being or distress.28 
Since feelings are specific representations or concepts, it is not possible for us to represent 
them in general terms. 
This consideration by itself suffices to show that music can only express the 
various accompanying adjectives and never the substantive, e.g., love itself. A 
specific feeling (a passion, say, or an affect) never exists as such without an actual 
                                                 
25 Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, p. 3. 
26 Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, p. 3. 
27 Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, p. 3. 
28 Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, p. 8. 
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historical content, which can only be precisely set forth in concepts. Music cannot 
(as if by way of compromise) render concepts as “indefinite speech”.29 
From this, Hanslick believes to have proved that it is not possible for music to have feeling as 
its content. Since music is not able to express anything specific, and since feelings according 
to Hanslick are always specific, it is not possible for music to express feeling. The feeling that 
result from our listening to music is a reaction in us to the music, it is not something in the 
music that is communicated or in any other way transferred from the music to us. 
 
After his refutation of what he sees as the central claims of the feeling theorists, as part of his 
negative thesis, Hanslick turns to the positive thesis of his book, trying to show what music 
can contain.  
What kind of beauty is the beauty of a musical composition? It is a specifically 
musical kind of beauty. By this we understand a beauty that is self-contained and 
in no need of content from outside itself, that consists simply and solely of tones 
and their artistic combination. Relationships, fraught with significance, of sounds 
which are in themselves charming – their congruity and opposition, their 
separating and combining, their soaring and subsiding – this is what comes in 
spontaneous forms before our inner contemplation and pleases us as beautiful.30 
His view is that the only thing that music can contain is musical building blocks: tone-
material: tones, rhythm, timbre etc. These building blocks are combined artistically in 
different forms, and that is all we can say about the matter. There are no specific feelings 
being communicated by this or that specific combination of tones, and it is not possible to 
represent feelings generally, as feelings are always specific. The structural parts of music just 
come together in different forms, to make different works of music. Some of these works are 
beautiful, some are not, but they do not contain anything other than musical elements. What 
can be beautiful in music, then, is the form that the tone-material is assembled into. From this, 
Hanslick concludes that the only thing music is capable of expressing, the only thing that can 
be contained in music, is musical ideas. 
If we now ask what should be expressed by means of this tone-material, the 
answer is musical ideas. But a musical idea brought into complete manifestation 
in appearance is already self-sufficient beauty; it is an end in itself, and it is in no 
                                                 
29 Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, p. 9. 
30 Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, p. 28. 
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way primarily a medium or material for the representation of feelings or 
conceptions. The content of music is tonally moving forms.31 
Hence, the only permissible way to speak about music for Hanslick, is in internal, music-
technical terms. The only things we can say about music, concerns the relations between the 
different parts of a piece, or their relations to other musical objects. However, what he 
believes to have achieved with this, is to establish the beautiful in music on music’s own 
terms. He elaborates: 
Thus, in order to make our case for musical beauty, we have not excluded ideal 
content but, on the contrary, have insisted on it. For we acknowledge no beauty 
without its full share of ideality. Basically what we have done is to transfer the 
beauty of music to tonal forms. This already implies that the ideal content of 
music is in the most intimate relationship with these forms. In music the concept 
of “form” is materialized in a specifically musical way. The forms which 
construct themselves out of tones are not empty but filled; they are not mere 
contours of a vacuum but mind giving shape to itself from within. Accordingly, 
by contrast with arabesque, music is actually a picture, but one whose subject we 
cannot grasp in words and subsume under concepts. Music has sense and logic – 
but musical sense and logic. It is a kind of language which we speak and 
understand, yet cannot translate. It is due to a kind of subconscious recognition 
that we speak of musical “thoughts”, and, as in the case of speech, the trained 
judgement easily distinguishes between genuine thoughts and empty phrases. In 
the same way, we recognize the rational coherence of a group of tones and call it a 
sentence, exactly as with every logical proposition we have a sense of where it 
comes to an end, although what we might mean by “truth” in the two cases is not 
at all the same thing.32 
In the end, when Hanslick puts forward his own view on what music can contain, he has to 
resort to the same vague language that he criticizes the feeling theorists for using at the outset. 
In a sense, he even echoes Mendelssohn who said that what was expressed in the music he 
loved was not too indefinite to put into words, but rather too definite.33 It points in the 
direction that Hanslick may have believed that music had content of an ineffable kind, 
something too profound to be put into words. However, through his wording, he is careful not 
to explicitly commit to a position of this kind. Ultimately, his resort to a more poetic language 
is understandable, though. The description of the aesthetic experience we have of music lends 
itself badly to a scientific and precise kind of language. What he tries to do in the above 
                                                 
31 Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, pp. 28-29. 
32 Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, p. 30. 
33 Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, “Letter to Marc-André Souchay” in Mendelssohn’s Letters, pp. 298-300. 
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citation, then, is to capture the feeling of listening to music, without having to commit to a 
view that claims that this is all held in the music. Hanslick acknowledges the close connection 
between music and the emotions, but he holds firmly onto the assertion that music cannot 
contain feelings. In this regard, he becomes the model for Peter Kivy. 
 
Hanslick’s explication of the musically beautiful anticipates some of the central themes in the 
debate that follows. The analogy he made between music and language is a common one, and 
is often used as an argument against the possibility of extra-musical content in absolute 
music. As I will go into later, it is argued that music is a language, with syntax and 
pragmatics, but deprived of semantics. Moreover, his insistence on the primacy of the form in 
musical beauty gave rise to the formalist views on music, which has become a prominent 




2 Kivy’s Formalism 
It is not an understatement to say that Peter Kivy is, almost singlehandedly, responsible for 
the fact that there is an active debate in the philosophy of music today. This is the main reason 
why I have chosen him as my main adversary when targeting formalism. While there are, of 
course, other formalists, it is with him that the position today is most closely associated. In 
addition, his views are well considered, even if I ultimately believe that they are wrong. I will 
spend this chapter going through his views on music, insofar as they are relevant to the main 
themes of my thesis. Hence, I will first see what he has to say on absolute music, then go 
through his strain of formalism, termed enhanced formalism, before I look at his views on the 
main question: whether there is meaning in a significant sense in music. 
 
2.1 Kivy’s Conception of Absolute Music 
 
Kivy’s definition of absolute music is straightforward. “By absolute music we mean 
instrumental music without text, program, extra-musical title, bereft of either literary or 
representational content. In other words, an art of purely abstract but perhaps expressive 
sound”.34 In short, Kivy’s use of the term absolute music is music without any extra-musical 
content. It is music that, qua music, cannot refer to anything beyond itself in a significant 
way. Kivy is wary of the use of the term absolute music. He prefers the use of music alone or 
pure music, but the use of absolute music has become ubiquitous, so in most cases he follows 
suit. His definition, however, of this kind of music remains the same throughout, even though 
he uses different terms on occasion, and the different definitions are sometimes worded 
slightly differently. I have two concerns regarding Kivy and absolute music. The first is that 
in mainly concerning himself with absolute music, he over-estimates the role of absolute 
music today. Most works of music are not examples of absolute music, neither historically 
nor today. And, as Jenefer Robinson will argue later, many works which are considered to be 
examples of absolute music, perhaps are not. This worry is not restricted to Kivy, but he does 
not go free of it either. The second is, as I will discuss when looking at Jenefer Robinson’s 
criticism of Kivy, that his definition, even though it is consistent, is perhaps not as general as 
                                                 
34 Peter Kivy, Antithetical Arts, p. 119. 
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he claims, and that he asks the definition to do too much work. In the present chapter, I will 
let Kivy’s definition of absolute music stand uncontested, to better facilitate the understanding 
of his views.  
 
2.2 Enhanced Formalism 
 
In the previous chapter we saw how Eduard Hanslick denied two claims about music and 
emotions; that it is the purpose of music to arouse the feelings, and that the content of music 
is feelings. Peter Kivy agrees that neither of these claims are true. Yet, as Hanslick, he still 
has a strong intuition that there is a close connection between music and the emotions. In his 
own strain of formalism, based on Hanslick, he claims that music can be expressive of 
feelings, more specifically what he calls the garden-variety emotions. To this effect, he sees 
his version of formalism as an enhancement of Hanslick’s formalism, hence the name 
enhanced formalism. 
 
Kivy gives a definition of enhanced formalism in his book, Introduction to a Philosophy of 
Music,35 stating that enhanced formalism is 
the doctrine that absolute music is a sound structure without semantic or 
representational content, but, nevertheless, a sound structure that sometimes 
importantly possesses the garden-variety emotions as heard qualities of that 
structure – an enhancement, in effect, of formalism as it has traditionally been 
understood.36 
This definition clarifies the core claims that enhanced formalism makes about absolute music. 
First, that absolute music is a sound structure. Second, that absolute music does not possess 
semantic content. Third, that absolute music does not possess representational content. 
                                                 
35 While this book is an introduction to the field, and an excellent one at that, there are many claims he makes in 
this book which are not stated elsewhere. Furthermore, as the title suggests, it is an introduction to a specific 
philosophy of music, namely his. While it deals with a variety of theories in the field, his aim in the book is 
always to argue for his own view. The fact that it is an introduction does not, in this case, mean that it is dumbed 
down. As such, I will be quoting a fair bit from this book. 
36 Peter Kivy, Introduction to a Philosophy of Music, p. 101. 
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Fourth, that absolute music can (but must not) possess the garden-variety emotions as heard 
qualities of the sound structure.  
 
The first claim is contested by some theorists,37 but I will not be discussing that issue at 
present, as it falls outside of the scope of this thesis. The second and third claims will be the 
focus of this chapter, and I will turn to them shortly. However, I would first like to discuss the 
fourth claim, since it may not be clear to the reader what garden-variety emotions and heard 
qualities are. 
 
2.2.1 Garden-variety Emotions and Heard Qualities 
 
Garden-variety emotions is a key concept for Kivy, and is a term that he uses regularly 
throughout his works. As the wording of the term shows, it is meant neither as a precise term, 
nor as a term that points to an exhaustive list of emotions that are included in the term. What I 
can gather from his use of the term, is that it refers to any of the more or less “regular” or 
“normal” emotions that we experience. The following example of a definition (or at least an 
explanation) he gives of the garden-variety emotions in Introduction to a Philosophy of 
Music, shows how he usually uses the term: “…the ‘garden-variety emotions,’ which is to 
say, the common, ordinary, basic emotions in the human repertory: joy, melancholy, anger, 
fear, love, and a few others of that kind”.38 The way garden-variety emotions can be in music 
(as opposed to in us), is analogous to the way redness is considered a seen property in a 
billiard ball.39 There is no semantic content in the billiard ball, and usually we would not say 
that it represents redness. It just is red. In the same manner, Kivy says that a melancholy 
piece of music does not have melancholy as semantic content, nor does it represent 
melancholy. It just is melancholy. The melancholy of that particular piece of music is a heard 
property or heard quality of it. There is a difference, however, between the way a billiard ball 
just is red, and the way a piece of music just is melancholy. The billiard ball’s redness is a 
                                                 
37 For instance, Jerrold Levinson in the article “What a musical work is”. 
38 Peter Kivy, Introduction to a Philosophy of Music, p. 18. 
39 Note that Kivy uses the terms property and quality interchangeably in this context. 
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simple quality, while the melancholy of music is a complex quality, or an emergent property. 
To argue that the billiard ball is red, we can do nothing else than to point to the billiard ball 
and say “look, it is red”. To argue that a piece of music is melancholy, however, we can point 
to specific structural properties in the piece and say, “this property and this property makes it 
so that the piece is melancholy”. This does not mean that we need to be aware of the 
properties that make a piece melancholy. 
That the emotive qualities of music are complex qualities should not be thought to 
imply that when someone is hearing, say, the melancholy quality of a musical 
passage, he or she is necessarily aware of the other qualities productive of the 
melancholy.40 
This kind of view on how emotions are a part of music is usually called cognitivism. The 
emotions we attribute to music are in the music, and we cognize them (perceive them as heard 
properties).  
 
The statement that music can possess garden-variety emotions as heard properties may lead us 
to suspect that Kivy is letting semantics back into music. However, he argues that it is 
possible for music to possess garden-variety emotions as heard qualities, through neither 
semantics nor representation. The answer to him lies in the structure (or form) of the music. 
When music is expressive of emotion, the expressivity is emerging from the structural 
features. In turn, however, the expressivity itself becomes a structural property at times. The 
expressivity of music has a dual role for Kivy; it is both emerging from the structure, and a 
part of the structure. Kivy thinks there are three emotionally expressive features in music:   
1. Sounding like humans expressing emotion (most prominently speech). 
2. Resemblance between the sound and visible expression of human emotion; a kind of 
analogous “movement” in the music to how people move when they are affected by 
different emotions. 
3. Certain musical features, most notably the major, minor and diminished chords.41 
                                                 
40 Peter Kivy, Introduction to a Philosophy of Music, p. 35. 
41 Peter Kivy, Introduction to a Philosophy of Music, p. 38. 
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The first feature is about the similarities of how people sound when expressing emotion, and 
how music sounds. 
Melancholy music and melancholy speech and utterance have some obvious 
sound qualities in common. Melancholy people tend to express themselves in soft, 
subdued tones of voice; and melancholy music tends to be soft and subdued. 
Melancholy people tend to speak slowly and haltingly; and melancholy music 
tends to be in slow tempi and halting rhythm. Melancholy people’s voices tend to 
‘sink,’ and tend to remain in the low vocal register; and melancholy music too 
exhibits the same characteristics. In contrast, cheerful people express themselves 
in bright, loud, sometimes even raucous – certainly not subdued – tones; and 
cheerful music tends to be bright, loud and in the high register. Cheerful people 
are not slow or halting in speech and utterance, but light and sprightly; and 
cheerful music, likewise, is quick and sprightly. Cheerful people’s voices rise 
energetically into the high register; and so too do the melodies of cheerful 
music.42 
In this way music can be expressive of emotion without representation or semantics. It is 
more a case of mimicry; the music sounds like the way emotionally affected people sound 
like. We hear emotions in the music, but according to Kivy we need not assume that it is a 
case of music representing the emotions or expressing them in propositions. We hear them in 
the same manner as we can see the face of a St. Bernard as sad, without believing that the dog 
actually is sad, nor believing that the dog tries to convey sadness in any way, either 
semantically or in another way representationally. This kind of musical expressiveness is 
most often present in the melody. “In all of this, particular attention should be paid to melody. 
For there is no aspect of Western music that is more amenable to analogy with the rise and 
fall in pitch of the human speaking voice than the rise and fall in pitch of music’s melodic 
line”.43 The single, prominent voice of the melody (and not polyphonic patterns, or the 
accompaniment) lends itself most easily to being heard as a human speaking voice, as it is the 
melody that draws our attention and becomes our focus when listening to music, when there 
is a melody present. 
 
The second expressive feature of music is the resemblance between the way the music sounds 
and how people affected by emotion move, or what they look like. 
                                                 
42 Peter Kivy, Introduction to a Philosophy of Music, p. 39. 
43 Peter Kivy, Introduction to a Philosophy of Music, p. 39. 
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Music is customarily described in terms very similar to those we use to describe 
the motion of the human body under the influence of such emotions as 
melancholy and cheerfulness. Thus a musical phrase may leap joyously, or droop, 
or falter, like a person in motion. To put it more generally, music is customarily 
described in terms of motion; and so the same descriptions we use to characterize 
it are frequently the ones we use to describe the visible motions of the human 
body in the expression of the garden-variety emotions.44 
While the analogy between the emotive tone of voice and the emotive tone of music gains 
plausibility from the fact that they are both sonic phenomena, this analogy draws on the way 
we speak about music, and tries to make an analogy between the way things look like and the 
way things sound like. At first, this may make the analogy seem weaker. An analogy between 
two different sense modalities does not seem as strong as an analogy between two different 
aspects of the same sense. However, we may consider rhythm. The analogy between the 
rhythm of the movement of emotionally affected human beings and the rhythm of the music 
seems more easily applicable to this relationship than to compare the movement of the music 
in general. Kivy does not spend much time considering rhythm at all in his writings.45  
However, when he does, he notes that he recognizes the importance of rhythm for the analogy 
between bodily movement and the way the music moves.  
The most obvious analogue to bodily movement in music is, of course rhythm. 
And it is an embarrassing commonplace, but nonetheless true, that in all sorts of 
ways, the rhythmic movement of the human body in all kinds of emotive 
expressions is mirrored by and recognized in music. To state the most common of 
the commonplaces: of course funeral marches are slow and measured, as sadness 
slows and measures our expression of it; of course rapid rhythmic pulses in music 
are suggestive of rapid behaviour under the influence of the lighter emotions; of 
course jagged and halting rhythms have their direct analogue in human expressive 
behaviour.46 
I am of the opinion that highlighting the role rhythm plays in the analogy between the way we 
move, and the way music moves makes the analogy almost as strong as the analogy between 
the emotionally affected voice and music. Why Kivy does not put more emphasis on this in 
                                                 
44 Peter Kivy, Introduction to a Philosophy of Music, p. 40. 
45 The only place, other than the citation below, that I could find was in a historical discussion of the importance 
of rhythm in the theories of the German ethnomusicologist Richard Wallaschek in “Herbert Spencer and a 
Musical Dispute” in Music, Language and Cognition, pp. 21-25. That discussion has no bearing on any of the 
present concerns. 
46 Peter Kivy, Sound Sentiment, p. 55. 
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his writings, I do not know, but I will bring it along, as I can only see that it makes his 
position stronger. Together, these two accounts of how music is expressive of emotion are 
known as the contour theory. 
 
The third kind of expressive features are what Kivy calls the “expressive chords”: the major, 
minor and diminished chords. Kivy thinks that these chords are expressing emotions as 
simple qualities.47 “These chords [major, minor, diminished] are generally perceived as 
cheerful, melancholy and anguished, respectively”.48 This claim is deeply rooted historically 
in Western music, and still enjoys widespread acceptance. With the exception of some 
changes in the perception of the minor chord, and to what degree it is permissible to end a 
piece on a minor chord, the general notion of what these chords express have remained 
constant in Western classical music for at least the last few hundred years.49 Thus, the 
expressivity of these chords seem to rely in large part on convention. They have been used to 
this effect for so long, that it (culturally) has become second nature for us to hear them as 
expressive in this manner. This is Kivy’s convention theory of how music is expressive of 
emotion. 
 
Intuitively, all of these three claims from Kivy are plausible. The prominent voice of the 
melody easily lends itself to comparison with a human speaking. Moreover, since the melody 
is frequently performed by a singer, uttering words along with the melody, the connection 
seems even closer. The analogy between the emotive tone of a human speaking voice and the 
emotive tone of a melody seems good. The analogy between how emotionally affected people 
move and the movement of the music turns out to work as well. Kivy finds support for this 
analogy in the ways we speak about music, and in the way the music moves. If more 
emphasis is put on the relation between rhythm and bodily movement, the analogy seems 
even stronger. 
                                                 
47 Peter Kivy, Introduction to a Philosophy of Music, p. 43. 
48 Peter Kivy, Introduction to a Philosophy of Music, p. 43. 
49 Up until the 18th century, composers would invariably end a piece on a major chord, even if the piece were in a 




The first two claims are analogies between music and parts of human behaviour. If these 
analogies hold, the question remains; why do we hear these analogies in the music? Kivy does 
not claim to have a definitive answer to this question, but he gives a tentative one. He draws 
on the phenomenon that we tend to see living things in inanimate objects, which is often 
explained evolutionary as a defence mechanism, or “to be on the safe side mechanism”.  
When presented with ambiguous figures, we tend to see them as animate rather 
than inanimate forms: as living rather than non-living entities. We tend to see 
living forms in clouds, in stains on walls, in the shadowy things lurking in the 
woods. We see the stick as a snake. Why? Because, perhaps, we are hard-wired 
by evolution – by natural selection – to do so. Evolution says: ‘Better safe than 
sorry. Better wrong than eaten.’ Living things can be dangers to you. It is better to 
see the stick, immediately, incorrectly, as a snake, than to be snake bit, in 
pondering the question, if it turns out to be a snake after all.50 
Kivy thinks that since this seems to be the case for sight, it may be the case for hearing as 
well. Just as we often see an ambiguous figure as an animate form, we hear ambiguous 
sounds as animate forms as well. We hear them as expressive of emotion because we are 
hard-wired to look for signs of life. However, Kivy observes that this tendency is not as 
strong for hearing as it is for vision. He explains this evolutionarily as well; sight is a primary 
survival sense for humans, while hearing is not.  
[I]t is not completely unreasonable, on evolutionary grounds, to think that, while 
seeing the ambiguous forms as animate remains a conscious phenomenon of 
human perception, the hearing of sounds that way has sunk back into semi-
consciousness as a kind of ‘background noise’.51  
Kivy suggests this as a plausible account, and later we will see that both Robinson and Young 
agree with him.  
 
Since both of the first two kinds of expressive properties are complex properties, or emergent 
qualities, they are a result of structural elements in the music. The expressive chords, on the 
other side, are according to Kivy, simple properties. This makes it tempting to see these 
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51 Peter Kivy, Introduction to a Philosophy of Music, p. 43. 
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chords as the emotional building blocks, or the foundation of his system. While this is partly 
the case, the emergent kinds of music expressiveness emerge from all kinds of musical 
structural elements, not only the expressive chords. The main difference is therefore that the 
expressive chords are expressive as simple qualities, we hear the major chord, in general as 
happy, the minor chord as sad and the diminished chord as a kind of uneasiness. There is 
nothing else to point to; it is just a description of how these chords (most often) sound. 
 
However, to see these chords as pure simple qualities is to exaggerate Kivy’s view. While the 
emotional tone of the above-mentioned chords is generally agreed upon in Western classical 
music culture, they do not have this quality on their own. They get their emotional 
expressivity only through being a part of musical syntax. 
Take, by way of illustration, the “anguished,” “restless” character of the 
diminished triad. By itself, a diminished triad has no such quality – it stands as an 
ambiguous cipher. But in its context, during a long period in the history of our 
musical tradition, it is an “active” chord; it has to go somewhere, lead to 
something. In this tradition, as a cadential chord, it does not make a well-formed 
formula, but an incomplete sentence.52 
Kivy has two suggestions as to how the expressiveness of the expressive chords has arisen. 
The first suggestion is that the expressiveness can be explained by the fact that the minor 
chord has a third that is a half-step ‘lower’ than the major chord, and that this, relatively 
speaking, gives a notion that the minor chord is ‘sinking’ or going down, while the major is in 
a sense uplifting or going up. The diminished chord sounds even more troubling, since both 
the third and the fifth are lowered.  
The first suggestion is that we hear the vertical structure of the chords as a kind of 
contour. Compared to the major triad – that is the major three-note chord C–E–G 
– the minor triad has a lowered third, that is, the E is the third of the C-major 
chord, the E flat is the third lowered a half step, the smallest interval in the 
Western harmonic system. (The E is called the ‘third’ because it is the third note 
up from the C: that is, C (1), D (2), E (3). The G is called a ‘fifth’ because it is the 
fifth note up). Now think of the lowered third, E flat as kind of sagging, or 
sinking, depressingly from E to E flat. Might that give a depressing, melancholy 
cast to the C-minor triad? There is a downward tending contour of the C-minor 
triad, as compared to the C-major one, like the downcast contour of the 
melancholy speaking voice or posture. And the diminished triad, C–E flat–G flat, 
                                                 
52 Peter Kivy, Sound Sentiment, p. 80. 
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is even more depressed: it has both a sinking third and a sinking fifth. Pretty far-
fetched? Perhaps so.53 
Kivy does not place too much faith in the above explanation. The second suggestion is that 
they work within a musical grammatical or syntactical context, in which the diminished chord 
is very active and therefore is very restless, this is less so with minor, while major sounds the 
most restful. The active nature of the diminished chord, for instance C–E flat–G flat, can be 
resolved by lowering the G flat to a D flat and raising the C to a D flat; suddenly things feel 
more at rest. 
Might one suggest, then, that what gives the diminished chord its dark, anguished 
quality [is] its function, in musical structure, as an active, unconsummated, 
unresolved chord? It is restless, so to say, in its musical function; when it occurs 
in a compositional structure, at least until fairly recently in the history of the 
Western harmonic system, it imparts that restlessness to the contour of the melody 
it accompanies. From its ‘syntactic’ or ‘grammatical’ role in music it gains, by 
association, as it were, even when alone, its restless, ‘anxious’ emotive tone.54 
Here we are back to the conventional explanation. Because of the highly active role the 
diminished chord has in the syntactical structure of music, it is expressive of restlessness 
when it goes unresolved for too long. This explanation also highlights the dual function that 
emotional expressivity has for Kivy; the restless nature of the diminished chord is a result of 
the (convention of) musical structure. But in turn, the restlessness that the diminished chord is 
expressive of (and the other expressive features of the music), helps constitute the structure of 
the musical work. 
 
2.3 No Meaning in Absolute Music 
 
Kivy is adamant that there is no such thing as meaning in music not accompanied by text. 
However, Kivy’s position is more nuanced than just denying that there is meaning in a broad 
sense in music. What he denies is that there is linguistic meaning or semantics in music. 
Further, he thinks that using meaning in other senses than the linguistic or semantic when 
discussing music are not good uses of the word (even if they can be permissible), and can be 
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changed for other words at an advantage. He believes that the word meaning is often being 
misused when it is used about music. This is a point worth keeping in mind. When Kivy 
denies that there is meaning in music, what he denies is that there is meaning there in the 
specific, linguistic sense of the word, not the general, broader sense of meaning. In this, most 
philosophers of music follow him. Robinson and Young agree, and Ridley does not directly 
contradict him. Few people have held that music can express propositions in a linguistic 
sense; most people would agree that to believe music could do this would be to exaggerate 
what music can do. When the question of meaning in music is contended, then, it is because 
other philosophers do not agree with Kivy about the definition of meaning. I will get to his 
discussion of meaning in a moment, but first we need to have a closer look at his evolutionary 
argument for why there is no semantics in music. 
 
As we saw earlier, Kivy gave an evolutionary account of how music can be expressive of 
emotions. In his book Music Alone, Kivy gives a similar account of why we frequently can 
hear emotions in music, but not propositions. Here, this leads into an argument for why music 
does not have linguistic meaning, or semantics. The starting point is a comparison between 
the sight and the hearing. He wonders why we have a music of sounds and not a music of 
sights (auditory music rather than visual music). He believes it is because vision has emerged 
as the primary survival sense, prompting us to make realistic interpretations of what we see. 
[B]ecause we have evolved with the sense of sight paramount in our survival, we 
have evolved “hard-wired,” to a certain extent, to see “defensively”; which is to 
say, we are compelled to place “realistic” or “representational” interpretations on 
visual perceptions. It is a knee-jerk reaction to protect us from potential danger, a 
phenomenon well known to psychologists through various experiments and, of 
course, well illustrated in the interpretation of Rorschach blots.55 
A visual music is therefore difficult to accomplish; whatever we look at, we seek to see it 
representationally or realistically because we have evolved that way. Assuming that a visual 
music would be analogous to sonic music, the visual music would have to consist of abstract, 
moving shapes and forms; much like a kaleidoscope, but composed with intention (not 
randomly), and more complex. Appreciating these forms in abstract without looking for (and 
finding) realistic shapes etc., would go against our natural tendency. Overriding this tendency 
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in ourselves is of course possible, but requires a lot of (deliberate) concentration on our part, 
whereas for normal music, this does not require much effort. Most people have no problem 
attending a classical concert, listening to the entire performance as intended, even if the 
concert lasts for more than an hour. It does not seem like the same would be the case for a 
concert of visual music. Thus, a visual concert would require a lot of work on our part, 
cognitively, and as such, it would be less enjoyable. The hearing, its survival importance 
having declined because of the survival primacy of vision, does not as easily hear sounds as 
representational or real, and is therefore in a better position to appreciate music than the sight 
would be, Kivy argues. 
 
We do, however, frequently interpret things we hear. This is because language is (originally) 
an audible phenomenon. Therefore, we often end up looking for meaning in music, rather 
than representation or mimesis.  
One interesting sidelight of this comparison between the eye and the ear is the 
frequency with which theorists try to make pure music out to be meaningful as 
opposed to representational. How frequently since the advent of pure instrumental 
music in the West, have we heard such claims as the following: “[a] piece of 
music is a communication. And if you are one of those to whom a Beethoven 
symphony is a lot of meaningless noise, you may say: ‘Tell me what it 
communicates’ – meaning, of course, ‘Tell me in words.’ What all such claims 
essentially amount to is the expression of a very strong feeling or impression that 
musical sounds are meaningful, accompanied by an inevitable recognition that 
they really are not (the latter signaled by inability to state what their meaning is), 
decked out as a profundity about their meaning being “nonverbal,” or “special,” 
or “too precise for mere discursive language to express.”56 Such perennial 
attempts to give music meaning suggest we are perfectly right in suspecting a 
tendency of the ear to interpret sound linguistically when given the least 
opportunity. And music does, indeed, offer that opportunity. For unlike random 
noise or even ordered, periodic sound, music is quasi-syntactical; and where we 
have something like syntax, of course, we have one of the necessary properties of 
language. That is why music so often gives the strong impression of being 
meaningful. But in the long run syntax without semantics must completely defeat 
linguistic interpretation. And although musical meaning may exist as a theory, it 
does not exist as a reality of listening.57 
                                                 
56 Citation within citation: B. H. Haggin, The Listener’s Musical Companion, p. 4. 
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This, then, is the main statement of Kivy’s view on meaning in music. Music is language-like 
in having a syntax, or at least something like a syntax. This leads many of us to constantly 
search for meaning in music, because it strikes us as something that should be there. 
However, music does not have semantics. This is agreed upon by most people who engage in 
the philosophy of music, both those who believe that music have meaning, and those who do 
not. It seems like an almost trivial truth that music is not capable of expressing propositions in 
the same manner as language. Kivy thinks that this fact alone, that music does not have 
semantics, should be taken to prove that music does not have meaning. 
 
While Kivy thinks that meaning in a linguistic sense is not possible in music, the likeness of 
music and language helps facilitate the emotional expressiveness of music. 
A second sidelight, already alluded to, can be stated very briefly. If the tendency 
of the ear to interpret musical sound as meaningful human utterance fails, as it 
must, what linguistically is left? Take the meaning away from the utterance, and 
one thing you may still have (though not necessarily) is the utterance’s emotional 
cast. I can, for example, sometimes tell by tone of voice that someone has said 
something to me angrily or sadly, even though what he or she said may have been 
lost on the wind. And the musical equivalent of the emotional tone of voice is, I 
have argued elsewhere, and others have argued before me, a prime mover in the 
recognition of what emotions music is expressive of. Thus the tendency of the ear 
to hear sound linguistically lends support to the claim that part of music’s 
expressive quality is due to the analogy of musical sound to passionate human 
speech. For although the tendency of the ear to hear music linguistically is easily 
defeated on the semantic level, as we have seen, it may not be so easily defeated 
at another linguistic level, that of emotional significance, where semantic 
parameters are not always required. And the evidence bears this suggestion out in 
the twin observations that we can never say what instrumental music means (in 
the semantic sense of the word) but frequently can, within certain limits, say what 
it is expressive of.58 
We hear from the emotive tone that music is reminiscent of a language, but we are not able to 
grasp any semantic meaning in it. However, this mode of listening opens us up to listening for 
the emotive properties that music express. 
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The observations Kivy has made about the difference between vision and hearing, and the 
likenesses of music and language, leads him to conclude that we are probably evolved to have 
a music of sounds and not a music of vision, and that the same evolutionary traits makes us 
hear only emotion in music, and not semantics. 
The conclusion of these observations, then, is that although the ear does, like the 
eye, have a strong tendency to interpret, its tendency is not to interpret sounds as 
representational or as natural phenomena but to interpret them as meaningful in 
the full linguistic sense. And since such a tendency is easily defeated by the 
stringent semantic requirements on successful linguistic interpretation, it puts up 
no impediment to the appreciation of pure, abstract musical sound while it 
contributes to the perception of expressive properties. This is not to say, of course, 
that the ear does not also tend to interpret sound naturalistically. But that 
tendency, I have argued, has weakened through natural selection, both in man and 
in other Primates, even as the visual sense has developed to the ascendancy it now 
enjoys. Thus where the ear tends to hear realistically, the tendency is weak, and its 
weakness defeats it in the face of pure musical structure. And where it tends to 
hear linguistically, though the tendency is strong, the stringent requirements of 
successful semantic interpretation more than compensate for its strength, and 
defeat easily, in a structure with syntax but no semantics, both the successful 
outcome and, indeed, the attempt itself. Such, at any rate is my hypothesis.59 
This is the basis for Kivy’s refutation of meaning in music. At the heart lies the claim that the 
lack of semantics in music implies that music is meaningless; it is deprived of meaning 
linguistically understood. Since most philosophers of music today agree that music has no 
semantics, this should mean that most philosophers of music today agree with Kivy that 
music has no meaning. However, judging from the wide range of papers and books which 
contain the words music and meaning in the title (such as the one you are reading now), this is 
not the case. That must mean that these other philosophers have other conceptions of meaning 
than Kivy. The disagreement seems to be over whether to use the word meaning for other 
kinds of meaning than the linguistic one. While this is part of the truth (Robinson and Young 
both clearly agree with Kivy that music does not have meaning in a linguistic sense, Ridley, if 
pressed, probably would as well), Kivy does not agree with the kinds of meaning his 
opponents find in music, even if they used a different word. Young uses the cognitive 
significance in place of meaning, still, his account of the cognitive significance of music 
would not go down well with Kivy. Hence, we must understand what Kivy think counts as 
meaning in a musical sense, to understand better why people agree with him that music has no 
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semantics, but disagrees on the fact that it has no meaning. It will also serve to show why 
Kivy thinks that his adversaries will not let go of the term meaning. 
 
2.4 Another Go at the Meaning of Music 
 
The article “Another Go at the Meaning of Music” is a response from Kivy, to criticism from 
Constantijn Koopman and Stephen Davies in their article “Musical Meaning in a Broader 
Perspective”. Kivy suspects that the disagreement that Koopman and Davies has with him is 
for the most part a verbal disagreement over the use of the word meaning, and I am inclined 
to agree with Kivy on this point. Their general approach to the philosophy of music is similar 
to Kivy’s; their aim in this criticism is just to keep a sense of meaning in there as well. 
Therefore, I will not go into detail of their criticism here. However, in Kivy’s reply, he has 
some illuminating things to say about his own views on the use of meaning applied to music. 
 
Kivy starts out by referring to the Oxford English Dictionary’s listing for meaning, stating 
that it  
gives ten or more meanings for “meaning”, depending on how carefully you want 
to count and how fastidious you are about nuances. Given such a superfluity of 
meanings, it is hardly surprising that music has “meaning”. Indeed, it would be 
surprising if anything didn’t.60 
Kivy’s problem is that, while all these various kinds of meaning are in different respects 
correct use of the word “meaning”, this is not what philosophers of music usually are after 
when they argue that music has meaning. Kivy suggests that what philosophers of music, 
music critics, etc. are usually after is semantic meaning, and not any of the other kinds. He 
thinks that this has historical roots. 
Music, since the end of the eighteenth century, or the beginning of the nineteenth, 
depending upon whom you read, has been considered a member of the community 
of “arts and letters”. That is a community in which one of the busiest and most 
admired occupations is that of the interpreter of meaning (henceforth interpreter 
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for short). Literary art works, belles lettres, works of the visual arts, works of 
philosophy and its satellites, are all subjects of intense interpretational scrutiny by 
a cadre of academics and independent scholars whose task it is to tell us “what it 
all means”. … And the content he or she interprets must needs be semantic 
content – “semantic” at least broadly conceived to include the “implied” messages 
of literary works as well as the representational content of the visual arts.61 
If this is what one is after in trying to argue for meaning in music, then only semantic 
meaning will do. Kivy does not deny that music can have meaning in another sense of the 
word than a strict semantic/linguistic sense of the word; he just does not think meaning in any 
of these other senses is what his opponents are after. Additionally, he thinks that in several 
places where the word meaning is used about music, there are other words that better describe 
the phenomena (i.e., “making sense” or “function”). He expresses a concern that a conflation 
of the different uses of the word meaning may take place, so that one can spend an entire 
article arguing that music has meaning in a very specific, non-linguistic sense of the word, 
only to conclude that semantic meaning in music has been restored. 
 
The main questions arising from this are first, whether Kivy’s assumption about the reasons 
proponents of meaning in music have for believing that music have meaning are true, and 
secondly, whether having semantics is the only thing that can make music qualify for 
interpretation. Robinson, Young and Ridley all believe that music qualifies for interpretation. 
Robinson and Ridley argue that this is because music has meaning in a different sense than 
the linguistic one, while Young rather uses the term cognitive significance. To avoid 
conflation between the different shades of meaning of meaning, I will frequently use 
cognitive significance instead of meaning. 
 
2.5 Music Is Just Meaningless Noise – So What? 
 
Kivy thinks that the exclusion of meaning from music is the main reason why people may 
want to take a non-formalistic position. The account he gives is roughly that if we remove 
meaning from music, then music becomes meaningless noise, and most people think 
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meaningless noise sounds like it is worthless. Furthermore, music is humanly construed 
sound. The only other comparatively structured set of sounds made by humans is language; 
“It is a human utterance”,62 and we assume that human utterances have meaning. Lastly, a 
formalistic account seems to move music away from the humanities; “It seems to be made an 
occult science, practiced by a secret society, with no attachment at all to the needs and 
concerns of normal human beings”,63 and; “[t]he ‘remoteness’ and ‘emptiness’ of musical 
formalism make these attitudes and practices seem incomprehensible. If formalism is true, 
what is absolute music to us?”64 Kivy has no qualms about accepting the implication that 
music without semantics is meaningless. There is no content there to be heard, and there is no 
reason to spend time looking for it.  
In short, absolute music, unlike the representational and narrative arts, can be 
fully appreciated, and has been since the beginning, by those who hear no content 
in it. And the content that responsible interpreters ascribe to it, in the form of story 
or philosophical significance, is of such paucity that it seems to add little or 
nothing in the way of value or appreciation to what is already there: that is, 
expressive musical form and structure.65 
To Kivy, the expressive form and structure alone is enough to warrant our listening to music. 
We do not need to add meaning to it to find pleasure or significance in it. In the last chapter of 
Introduction to a Philosophy of Music, he even tips his hat to Schopenhauer, claiming that 
music can have a liberating power, courtesy of being non-representational and meaningless.66 
Most other forms of art are about our world, or at least problems or ideas similar to those 
found in our world. Therefore, these other kinds of art, be it literature, poetry, painting or 
drama, do not liberate us from our everyday struggle; rather, they invite us to reflect upon it. 
Music, since it has no content, is free of this, therefore listening to music can be a truly 
liberating experience.67 
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63 Peter Kivy, Introduction to a Philosophy of Music, p. 138. 
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In short then, Kivy argues that music does not have semantics, and by implication no 
meaning, in the sense that would be interesting to philosophers of music and the like. 
Moreover, he argues, we do not need there to be meaning in music, because people who do 
not perceive meaning in music appreciate it nonetheless. In fact, he even argues that the lack 
of meaning in music may be a positive, that it gives music a kind of liberating power that the 
other arts do not share. 
 
So far, enhanced formalism stands well up to scrutiny. Some of its claims sound shocking or 
counter-intuitive at first, but in many cases it can be written down to the technical use of 
words being confused with the natural use (such as the word meaning denoting only 
semantic/linguistic meaning). However, the core of Kivy’s formalism does still not sit right 
with me. Though the notion of meaning for Kivy is restricted to the semantic notion, he also 
denies that music is capable of representing and arousing aesthetically significant emotion. 
These are concepts I think are at least partly responsible for musical meaning, conceived of in 
a non-semantic sense. His account does not just disallow the word meaning, it disallows kinds 
of content or significance that others would describe as meaningful (in another sense than the 
linguistic one). For instance, neither Robinson’s narrativism nor Young’s musical 
representation, which will be discussed in the next chapter, would be allowed by Kivy. They 
all agree that music does not have semantics, and that music probably can be said to have 
meaning in one of the other senses of the word. Still, the meaning that Robinson and (the 
cognitive significance that) Young finds in music, is not there to be found for Kivy, even if a 
different word than meaning was used. 
 
Kivy, in the end, was sceptical of his own evolutionary arguments. While they are accepted 
(or at least seen as plausible) by many of his opponents, he himself ended up not commiting 
to them.  
The biologist Stephen J. Gould scorns such armchair evolutionary explanations as 
I have given, labeling them, contemptuously, ‘just-so stories,’ the point being that 
a natural selection story, just like Kipling’s fanciful ‘explanations’ for how the 
leopard got its spots, or the elephant its trunk, can be made up by almost anyone, 
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including an amateur like myself, for any trait you like. So it is probably wise not 
to place much faith in these exercises.68 
In the end, his qualms about these kinds of evolutionary explanations leads him to lay the 
whole question of how we come to hear music as expressive dead, urging us to treat it as a 
“black box”. “We know what comes in, and what comes out, but what causes what goes in to 
produce what comes out – of that we are ignorant”.69 These considerations are expressed after 
dealing with music’s expressive features, i.e. the analogies to human emotive voice and 
movement, and the expressive chords (and similar musical features). And it seems perfectly 
fine for his position to leave the question of how these features work unresolved, since there is 
consensus that music can (at least) be expressive of emotion in this manner. To him, it is 
enough to give a plausible account that it occurs. However, as we will see, his opponents have 
taken up the theory, and use it to their own aims.  
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3 Critique of Kivy’s Formalism 
As formalism, from the time of Hanslick and throughout the 20th century, emerged to be one 
of the prominent positions in the philosophy of music, and influenced the music criticism to 
be more analytical and more focused on the internal relations of musical works, a counter-
reaction was inevitable. Many listeners, musicians and composers feel strongly that music has 
meaning, be it in a broad or narrow sense of the word. So, while Kivy has argued 
convincingly that there is no meaning in music in a linguistic sense, and most people follow 
him in this, there is a motivation for many to hold on to the notion of meaning in music. This 
is my own view, and it is the view of Robinson and Young as well.  
 
In this chapter, then, I will consider three philosophers with differing accounts of what is 
meaningful in music. In different respects, they will help me with my aim of challenging 
Kivy’s conception of absolute music. Jenefer Robinson and James O. Young both accept 
Kivy’s claim that music does not have meaning in a linguistic sense. Still, they each hear 
something in music that is at least akin to meaning (Robinson uses the word, Young does 
not), although not in the linguistic sense. They both contest Kivy’s claims that music does not 
represent or arouse emotion, and build their respective accounts of music’s significance to us 
on this. Robinson also discusses Kivy’s definition and use of the term absolute music, which 
she thinks accurately describes far fewer works than Kivy holds. Robinson’s position is called 
narrativist, narrativism being the other mainstream theory in contemporary analytical 
philosophy of music. Young simply terms himself as an anti-formalist. As can be expected 
from the term he chooses for his position, his project in the book Critique of Pure Music is a 
mainly negative one, that is, he wants to refute formalism in general and Kivy’s formalism 
specifically. Even so, he constructs an argument that holds that music is expressive of, 
capable of arousing and capable of representing emotion. As such, the positive conclusions 
of his arguments are interesting.  
Aaron Ridley’s criticism of Kivy comes from another route. He disagrees with Kivy’s view 
on language, and as such with his view on linguistic meaning as well. Hence, he does not 
need to agree with the conclusion that music does not have a semantic dimension. His 
statement of it is rather tentative, though; he argues that in the analogy between music and 
language, we should perhaps be a little more confident of our understanding of music, and a 
little less confident of our understanding of language. With the introduction of Ridley’s 
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notion of paraphrase, the focus shifts somewhat. I will argue that if we look at Robinson’s 
and Young’s accounts of music not as attempts to say what music is, but rather as attempts at 
paraphrasing the content of music, in an effort to show our understanding of it, they become 
much stronger. 
 
3.1 Jenefer Robinson: Persona Theory, Narrativism and Critique of 
Absolute Music 
 
If we want to claim that music does indeed have extra-musical content, we need a plausible 
account of how music has this content. In the contemporary debate, the main theory for 
explaining how musical works have extra-musical content is narrativism. Narrativists believe 
that we find an overarching narrative in musical works, which is responsible for (at least part 
of) the meaning we find in it. The terminology is borrowed from literary theory, and among 
different proponents of narrativism there are smaller or larger degrees of similarities 
conceived between the way narratives work in music and literature. Since there is broad 
agreement that music does not have a proper semantic dimension, the narratives are usually 
considered as expressive trajectories, poetic ideas, or, as Robinson holds, plot archetypes (or 
just plots). What all these kinds of narratives have in common is that they convey meaning or 
another kind of cognitive significance, without relying on semantics. Furthermore, narrativists 
do not usually claim that a work of music can tell a specific narrative without the help of 
words (or other forms of art capable of representing concepts or objects more specifically). In 
the following section I will discuss the views of Jenefer Robinson, who is a narrativist at 
heart. In following with one of the themes of my thesis, I will focus on Robinson’s critique of 
Kivy’s sharp distinction between absolute and programme music. In her collaboration with 
Gregory Karl in the articles “Shostakovich’s Tenth Symphony and the Musical Expression of 
Cognitively Complex Emotions”, and “Yet Again, ‘Between Absolute and Programme 
Music’” they put forth the central claims of narrativism through analysis of Shostakovich’s 





3.1.1 The Role of Emotion in Music 
 
To begin with, it seems prudent to clarify in what respects Robinson and Kivy agree, and in 
what respects they disagree. Both Robinson and Kivy hold that music is capable of expressing 
emotion. However, Kivy restricts the range of emotion music can express to the garden-
variety, which excludes cognitively complex emotions, such as shame or hope. Robinson 
disagrees on this point. Furthermore, they both agree that music does not have a semantics 
proper, music alone cannot make propositions or make statements about the world under 
normal circumstances. Lastly, Kivy does not believe that music arouses (aesthetically 
significant) emotion in the listener, while Robinson holds that the arousal of emotion is one of 
the keys to understanding music. Kivy does believe that music can arouse a special kind of 
musical emotion, which he refers to in a range of different ways, as for instance either a kind 
of excitement, exhilaration or as being moved by music.70 Robinson agrees that arousal of this 
kind of appreciative emotion does occur when listening to music, but claims that it does not 
exhaust the possibilities of arousal of emotions by music. 
What I want to suggest is that in addition to the sophisticated emotions of 
appreciation, which Kivy identifies as “being moved” by certain perceived aspects 
of the music, there are more primitive emotions aroused by music, perhaps 
requiring less developed cognitive mediation. There are, after all, moments in 
music which make us jump or startle us. Similarly, the perception of certain 
rhythms may be enough – without further cognitive mediation – to evoke tension 
or relaxation, excitement or calm. If the melodic and harmonic elements in a piece 
of music affect our emotions, this would seem to require familiarity with the 
stylistic norms of the piece, but no further cognitions need be required in order for 
us to feel soothed, unsettled, surprised or excited by developments in the music.71 
We will call this theory the direct arousal of emotion. On this view, there are certain elements 
in the music, be it minute parts like a progression of chords or part of a theme, or larger 
structural parts as a whole, that arouse emotions of a primitive kind in us. The arousal of these 
emotions does not require much from us cognitively. We hear a disturbing passage and we 
feel disturbed. We hear a surprising chord and we are surprised. To Robinson, the direct 
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 39 
arousal is a fact of listening, and it informs our understanding of the musical work as a whole. 
Following Leonard Meyer, she holds that the direct arousal of emotion is a constitutive part of 
the formal structure of the music. 
If we are experienced in the style of the piece, then we have certain expectations 
about the way the music will develop; in a meaningful piece of music these 
expectations will be either frustrated or satisfied in unexpected ways. As we listen 
new expectations are constantly being aroused and we are just as constantly being 
surprised by novel developments, relieved by delayed resolutions, made tense by 
the delays etc., etc. In short, understanding musical structure, according to Meyer, 
is not just a matter of detached analysis; rather, it is impossible without the 
arousal of feeling in the listener.72 
Furthermore, she thinks that direct arousal also plays a role in the expression of emotion. 
Where Kivy takes contour (the resemblance between music and the way emotionally affected 
people speak and move) and convention to be the basis for music being expressive of 
emotion, Robinson believes that we need to add the direct arousal of emotion to the list to get 
the full picture. 
The “direct” arousal of cognitively simple emotions such as being made surprised, 
disturbed, satisfied, relaxed, etc. is a clue not only to the formal structure of a 
musical piece, as Meyer showed, but also to its structure of emotional 
expressiveness.73 
She agrees, then, with Kivy, insofar as some kinds of musical expression are due to contour or 
convention. But where Kivy’s theory had problems accounting for certain kinds of 
expressiveness, Robinsons notion of direct arousal can account for these cases. 
 
The kinds of emotion that are aroused directly by music are, according to Robinson, of a 
simple kind. Crucially they have a limited cognitive content. Feelings such as surprise, 
unease, tension, relaxation, etc., are immediate reactions to what we hear; we do not need to 
consciously think about them, and then explicitly consider them.74 “Music can make me feel 
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disturbed or calm just by perceiving it (listening to it). The feeling is a result of a perception 
and to this degree it has “cognitive content,” but not the full-blown cognitive content required 
for tragic resolve, angry despair or unrequited passion.”75 However, working together with 
other features of the music, such as the expressive and formal structure of a work, these 
simple, aroused emotions can help to express cognitively complex emotions, such as hope or 
unrequited passion. Robinson, together with Gregory Karl, argues this point in the article 
“Shostakovich’s Tenth Symphony and the Musical Expression of Cognitively Complex 
Emotions”. Kivy will allow that music can express emotion, but follows Hanslick in saying 
that these emotions cannot be directed towards something. Music can express some emotions 
that need not have an aboutness or directedness, for instance sadness, joyfulness or 
restlessness, since these seem to be expressible without a specific object. Hence, Kivy does 
not think that music can express cognitively complex emotions, like hope, shame, jealousy 
etc., since they seem to require an object. To put it with Hanslick: “The feeling of hope cannot 
be separated from the representation of a future happy state which we compare with the 
present; melancholy compares past happiness with the present”.76 Robinson disagrees. She 
believes that the music’s capability of arousing emotion directly means that music is in fact 
capable of expressing cognitively complex emotions. Music has this power through our 
imagining of the structure of a work as a kind of narrative, told (among other things) through 
the perceived psychological changes in a musical persona. In “Shostakovich’s Tenth 
Symphony and the Musical Expression of Cognitively Complex Emotions”, Robinson and 
Karl go on to show how the attribution of a musical persona to a musical work enables our 
understanding of it. 
Like Cone and Levinson, we think that musical expression can at least sometimes 
be analyzed as a kind of gestural expression of emotional or other psychological 
states in a musical persona, whether it be the composer’s or that of some 
indeterminate character or characters in the music. We would go further than 
Levinson, however, and argue that the expressive structure of some pieces of 
music can be interpreted as an unfolding of the psychological experience of the 
musical persona over time. As the listener experiences such a piece, she imagines 
of the musical gestures she hears that they are the expression of a series of 
psychological states in the musical persona, and may sometimes – as Walton 
suggests – imaginatively experience these states as her own. We cannot hope to 
defend this thesis in detail here. Instead we will confine our attention to a 
particular piece of music which we think exemplifies our thesis. As we shall 
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argue, Shostakovich’s Tenth Symphony can be plausibly interpreted as a drama of 
feeling and impressions ascribed to the works persona. We shall claim that within 
the work’s expressive structure there is a passage of experience of the cognitively 
complex emotion of hope or hopefulness, and that if we consider the structure of 
the work as a whole, we can attribute to the musical the complex cognitive states 
characteristic of hope.77 
Shostakovich’s Tenth Symphony, Robinson argues, stands in a tradition that originated in 
Vienna, called the Grosse Sinfonie, in which the works are generally seen as “a progression 
from dark to light or struggle to victory (adversity to salvation, illness to health, etc.)”.78 
Works in this mould usually starts out as dark and turbulent, and ends in a triumphant finale 
(think of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony). Robinson and Karl focus on the passage in the third 
movement of Shostakovich’s Tenth, which begins with a horn call. They claim that through 
citation of turbulent passages from the first movement, the anticipation of passages in the 
finale, and the steadfast way that the horn call persists against, and finally triumphs over 
dissonant figures from the strings, this passage of music is expressing hope. To be able to 
accurately examine whether this is the case, they start by giving a characterization of hope. 
In general, then, if a person P hopes for some state (event, etc.) S, then normally 
(1) P wishes for S; (2) P conceives of the occurrence of S as a more pleasant 
outcome than its nonoccurrence; (4) if P is able to, P will try to bring it about that 
S; and (5) P’s focus of attention on or contemplation of S is a source of pleasure – 
or relief – to P.79 
Through formal features of the music (citation of earlier passages), the overall expressive 
features of the work (the relation between the mood of the present passage and the first), and 
direct emotional arousal (the calmness of the passage, and the steadfastness of the horn call), 
they argue that the (assumed) musical persona of their focal passage expresses hope in three 
ways. First, the persona  
looks forward to a future state conceived of as more pleasant than the currently 
prevailing grim state of affairs. F [the focal passage] conveys this part of the 
cognitive content of hope, because it anticipates the future happy state represented 
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by the lively theme … – the only remotely cheery theme in the whole work – 
while being itself surrounded by the dark reminiscences of [the opening theme].80 
Second, through the steadfastness of the horn calls, they argue that the musical persona 
displays both a wish for and a striving to bring about the future state of affairs that is the 
object of the hope. Third, the calmness of the passage shows the pleasure that lies in hope 
itself. This is further underlined by the fact that this is the only cheery theme in the work. 
 
Peter Kivy disagrees with this analysis. In his book Antithetical Arts, which deals mainly with 
the relation between music and words (or literature), he devotes an entire chapter to Robinson 
and Karl’s article. The three main arguments that Kivy offer against narrativism are: (1) 
music has a large degree of repetition, the same amount of repetition is not acceptable in 
narratives; (2) the plots suggested for the musical works are too banal to explain the greatness 
or profundity of music; and (3) if music has plot, it must have agents, as plots have agents. If 
music has agents, they are nameless and featureless. Great literary agents are not nameless 
and featureless. If music has plot, it is at least not great. 
 
The rebuttal from Robinson and Karl, in their reply to Kivy, “Yet Again, ‘Between Absolute 
and Programme Music’”, goes as follows. Against (1), they first point to poetry, highlighting 
how repetition is a fairly common device in many poetic traditions. On the other hand, even 
though repetition is a central element in most music, we find that in absolute music, which is 
almost always implicitly music in the western classical tradition, repetition has become less 
common and in many cases less literal when it occurs. Needless to say, music is in general 
still more repetitious than literature, but Robinson and Karl argue that the difference is not as 
big as Kivy makes it out to be. Especially in works which are traditionally interpreted 
narratively, such as some of Beethoven’s sonata-based works, the traditional patterns of 
repetition are not strictly adhered to. “For example, in the first movements of his ‘Tempest’ 
sonata, the ‘Erocia’ symphony, the ‘Appassionata’ sonata, and the string quartet Op. 95, the 
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recapitulations radically transform the material of the exposition”.81  As such, (1) seems 
weakened, it is not necessarily true that the amount of repetition found in music would be 
unacceptable in literature. 
 
Against (2) they argue that Kivy mistakes the plot summary for the actual aesthetic object. 
Kivy states that  
Robinson’s musical persona, and his or her completely empty skeleton of a story 
– a plot outline, merely, not yet a plot – give us no such fictional materials as can 
be got from the novels of Austen and Dickens, an must, therefore, leave us 
profoundly uninterested and profoundly unmoved.82  
Robinson and Karl will answer that the descriptions given of musical works are just that, plot 
outlines or plot summaries. “Plot summaries do not explain the aesthetic value of musical 
works any more than they do the aesthetic value of novels, dramas or poems”.83  To elaborate 
their point; if I tell you a summarized version of the plot of War and Peace, and your reply is 
that you cannot understand how this is taken to be great literature, as it is banal, consisting of 
“first he did this, then she did that” etc., my answer would be that you do not understand what 
a plot summary is. Of course, a summarized version of War and Peace is going to be banal 
compared to the original work. The plot summary told in words is the summary, the plot itself 
is just the music, in the same manner that the plot in a book is told through the book, or the 
plot in a movie is told in the movie. A summary will necessarily seem unimpressive in 
comparison (unless the work summarized is really bad). The question Kivy must answer is 
why this should be any different for a plot summary of a musical work. Thus, providing a plot 
summary for a musical work is more akin to the synopsis of a book than the book itself. I will 
return briefly to this point after my discussion of Ridley, as his notion of paraphrase may shed 
some light on it. 
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Kivy’s argument (3) is implicitly aimed at the theory of a musical persona. The musical 
persona theory posits an imagined person, an assumed psychological subject of the music. In 
many cases this person is taken to be the composer herself, though it need not be so by 
necessity. The theory has as many different iterations as there are people holding it, what they 
usually have in common, though, is that we can understand what is expressed by music 
through empathizing, or in other ways understanding the imagined persona of the work. This 
can then be taken to account for how emotions are aroused in us by music (we empathize with 
the musical persona, and have emotions aroused by empathy), and we can hear narratives, 
told through the psychological states of the persona. Kivy’s misgivings with these kinds of 
theories begin from a subjective phenomenological point of view. 
I myself was deeply moved by music long before I was ever introduced to the idea 
that one can imagine musical works as having personae. I am not aware that, in 
those days, I ever imagined any such character expressing emotions in the musical 
works I listened to. Nor do I do it now. As far as I can tell, music moves me 
deeply without my being aware at all of musical personae expressing their 
emotive states.84 
Kivy’s experiences should be taken seriously. As will be discussed later, James O. Young, 
whom has done considerable work collecting empirical data concerning listeners’ experiences 
of music, has found no evidence that people hear a persona in the musical work. I do not, 
however, think that this fact on its own is enough to reject the persona theory completely. It is 
possible that this is in fact what happens when people have emotion aroused by music, but 
that the mechanisms are not available to them before they are told that this is how it works. 
Since Kivy reports that he does not have his emotions aroused by music, the revelation of 
these mechanics means nothing to him. He does not have emotion aroused; neither by a 
musical persona, nor by any other means.  
 
Still, I am inclined to agree with Kivy and Young on this point; I do not believe that most 
people who have emotions aroused by music are imagining a persona of the work. I certainly 
do not do it myself. Proponents of the persona theory will say that in many, even most cases, 
the musical persona is that of the composer. If the persona theory is conceived in this manner, 
I find it more plausible. It makes sense to hear a musical work as expressing something that 
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the composer wants to express. But having to call it an imagined or assumed persona, and 
opening the possibility for it being another person than the composer, seems excessive. 
 
Back to (3); Kivy thinks that the idea of a musical narrative seems to imply the persona 
theory, and Robinson agrees. The gist of Kivy’s argument is that the agent or character put 
forward in a musical work does not have names or features, and as such they lack depth and 
the possibility to move us. And, since great literature moves us, in part through the depth and 
features of the characters, and music lacks this, then music cannot be great if narrativism is 
correct. Robinson and Karl’s answer is that we do not always know that much about the 
characters in the great narratives. 
Of course, it is quite true that the postulated musical persona in Beethoven’s Fifth 
is not specified in the detailed way that the characters in novels usually are. But 
notice that the protagonist of a lyric poem such as the ‘Ode to a Nightingale’ is 
not usually characterized in any detail either. What do we learn about Keats’ 
protagonist other than that he is a poet who longs for a world of eternal beauty far 
removed from the miseries of life on earth? As for Oedipus, he is a man who 
pursues the truth no matter where it takes him. Otherwise we know very little 
about the personality of Oedipus. Indeed, Aristotle famously used Oedipus the 
King as an example of his view that poetry is more philosophical than history 
because it is concerned with the universal rather than the particular.85 
Robinson and Karl think that Kivy misses this point, that a lot of great literature is great 
because it is general and thus, unspecific. They do not see the lack of background information 
about the musical persona as a hinderance for music being great, as there are examples of 
great literature that has comparatively unspecified protagonists. Ultimately, they believe that 
Kivy misconstrues the view of narrativists. 
In general, the problem with Kivy’s approach is that he assumes that the 
narrativists mean to ascribe to apparently absolute music detailed stories with 
carefully delineated characters such as one finds in a realistic novel or play. But 
virtually no-one in the musical community interprets apparently pure music in the 
way he describes. The mainstream narrativists have, by and large, carefully 
qualified and delimited their comparisons to literature, using their borrowed terms 
metaphorically to elucidate what they acknowledge to be a form of intrinsically 
musical content.86 
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Furthermore, where Kivy says that there cannot be a narrative in music because the assumed 
characters in musical works are not specific enough for a story to be told, Robinson and Karl 
think they have shown that it does not need to be the case that a character in a literary 
narrative is specified either. And, since it is possible to have narratives in literature without 
specified, detailed characters, they hold, it should be possible in music too. 
 
3.1.2 Absolute and Programme Music 
 
Having defended narrativism against some of the central complaints from Kivy, Robinson and 
Karl put forward a complaint against Kivy. They argue that Kivy’s distinction between 
absolute and programme music is altogether too strict; most works do not fall squarely into 
one or the other of the categories. Kivy’s distinction is to some degree mirrored in the debate 
throughout the 19th century about how music should be composed, i.e., should the composer 
include a programme or not, also; what status does the music in opera or ballets have, etc. 
However, since programme music just singles out one specific kind of music with added 
content, I will rather speak here about the distinction between absolute music and non-
absolute music, as it will clarify the discussion. 
 
In Antithetical Arts, Kivy states that  
an attempt to show that any example of [absolute music] does have semantic, 
narrative, or representational content is, so I will argue, best understood as an 
attempt to show not that that particular example of absolute music has semantic, 
narrative, or representational content, but that that particular example is not an 
example of absolute music, so defined at all.87 
A potential problem looms here. Kivy’s definition of absolute music has two parts; “It is 
music, as defined, without text, title, program, dramatic setting, or any other extra-musical 
apparatus” and “music, as defined, without representational, narrative, semantic, or other 
extra-musical content”.88 Now, the argument he gives, can make it sound like he makes it 
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definitionally true that absolute music does not have extra-musical content. In that case, the 
argument is at best trivial. Kivy notices, of course, and argues that while it may seem like he 
makes his argument true by definition, he is in fact just making the argument from the most 
common definition. To reinforce his point, he claims the authority of the Harvard Dictionary 
of Music. “Absolute Music. Music that is free from extramusical implications. The term is 
used most frequently in contradistinction to program music, which is inspired in part by 
pictorial or poetic ideas”.89 This shows, in Kivy’s opinion, that the definition he uses is not 
one he has tailored himself to suit his argument, rather, he is making his argument from a 
definition that most people accept. 
Given this definition of absolute music, which is I note again not some 
idiosyncratic definition tailored for an argument, but the well-established meaning 
of “absolute music,” any “successful” demonstration that some work of “absolute 
music” is not free of “extramusical implications” (as the Harvard Dictionary puts 
it) must be understood as a demonstration that, contrary to what we thought, the 
work is not “absolute music” properly so-called.90 
Kivy argues, then, that while there still may be some works that we believe are examples of 
absolute music that turn out to be non-absolute music, most works of absolute music, are 
proper examples of it. Furthermore, he thinks that if anyone wants to challenge this, they 
would be wise not to say that absolute music can have narrative, semantic or representational 
content, but rather that there are no true examples of absolute music. Kivy believes that this is 
an extreme position. However, we could criticize the strict division of music as either 
absolute or non-absolute music. Something along these lines is what Robinson and Karl argue 
in “Yet Again, ‘Between Absolute and Programme Music’”. They want to contest the claim 
that there is a clear distinction between absolute music and non-absolute (or programme) 
music, saying, “much music falls between absolute and programme music”.91 In analysing 
Shostakovich’s Tenth, as well as some discussion of other works in the Grosse Sinfonie 
tradition, they believe to have shown that many works that are described as, or even seen as 
paradigm cases of absolute music are still not completely devoid of content. This is not 
necessarily due to some hidden programme, so that the piece is secretly programme music. 
Rather, it cannot be absolute music, as Kivy defines it, because it has content. Robinson and 
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Karl hold that “Much of the argument in Antithetical Arts is designed to show that where 
narrative interpretations of a piece of apparently absolute music seem most plausible, it is 
because the music is in fact programme music”.92 The threat of non-falsifiability persists in 
Kivy’s account. He has argued that we do not need to worry about this, as his definition of 
absolute music reflects the common way of understanding the term. To this end he appeals to 
the authority of the Harvard Dictionary. However, what constitutes absolute music is still 
contested philosophically. The appeal to a dictionary does not change this. I would argue that 
a better descriptive definition of absolute music would consist of just the first part of Kivy’s 
definition; “It is music, as defined, without text, title, program, dramatic setting, or any other 
extra-musical apparatus”.93 This way, the definition of absolute music does not make claims 
about issues which are philosophically contended. 
 
Robinson and Karl have a more nuanced approach. They seem to believe that there may exist 
at least some works of absolute music. However, they conceive of the sharp divide between 
absolute and non-absolute music as false. Works of music are typically not either completely 
devoid of extra-musical content or described in detail in a programme or some other manner. 
Rather, works of seemingly absolute music can have a narrative structure without an 
accompanying text. 
the symphonies that we have been discussing cannot be analysed simply as sound 
structures with expressive properties, as Kivy thinks. Nor are they examples of 
literalist programme music. They are embedded in the history of expressive 
genres, and cannot be fully understood unless this history is taken into account.94 
As will be argued by Young and Ridley as well; to understand music we need to take its 
history and tradition into account. When we do, Robinson and Karl conclude that absolute 
and programme music are not two incomparable sizes; rather they are at the opposite ends of 
a continuum. Kivy shows throughout his works that he is excellently historically informed. As 
such, it may be a mistake to accuse him of not taking history or tradition into account, since 
he frequently does. What Robinson and Karl probably mean by this then, is not that Kivy has 
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not considered history and tradition (as he demonstrably has), but that he does not let history 
and tradition play a part in determining the content of music.  
 
Robinson’s critique of Kivy has shown that he is wrong in dismissing extra-musical content 
in absolute music, or, if one accepts his definition, that far fewer works than what he grants 
are actually absolute music. Furthermore, she advances an interesting theory about how there 
can be extra-musical content in so-called absolute music, and capably defends it from the 
main objections from Kivy. I believe that narrativism is a good theory of meaning in music, 
with its flaws. I am sceptical of the persona theory that underlies it, to the degree that the 
persona considered is another than that of the composer. Furthermore, I believe that we 
should not consider what occurs in music as a narrative in a literal sense.95 However, if we 
consider a narrative description of a musical work as a paraphrase in the sense Ridley 
understands it, I think we are closing in on a strong theory of meaning in music. 
 
Robinson has another advantage over Kivy, on which I have not yet gone into detail: the 
available empirical evidence seem to favour her account over that of Kivy. Robinson puts 
forward much of this evidence in her book Deeper Than Reason. I will discuss much of the 
data provided by Robinson, together with more up to date research on music appreciation and 
perception in the next section on Young, as his work is more recent, and his conclusions rest 
more heavily on said data. 
 
3.2 James O. Young: Critique of Pure Music  
 
The criticism against Kivy that comes from James O. Young is similar to that from Robinson 
in at least two respects; both of them discuss more or less within the framework that Kivy has 
established, and both hold that music has cognitive content, due to the fact that music can 
arouse emotion in the listener. As mentioned earlier, Young terms himself an anti-formalist. 
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However, he follows Kivy in being sceptical about the use of the term meaning in connection 
with music. Young believes that music does not have meaning, as he prefers to use the term 
meaning in the Fregean sense. 
The cognitive significance of a semantic representation, of a sentence, is its 
meaning. The meaning of a sentence is given, many philosophers of language 
agree, by its truth-conditions. Some philosophers of music speak of the ‘meaning 
of music’, but this is to use the word meaning imprecisely. I prefer to use the 
word ‘meaning’ in its Fregean sense. Works of music are not sentences, and they 
are not composed of sentences. Works of music do not have truth-conditions and 
they do not have meanings in Frege’s sense. Meaning is, however, only one sort 
of significance. Works of music have a different sort of cognitive significance.96 
He still believes that music has content or cognitive significance of a kind that many other 
philosophers of music are tempted to call meaning. This content can be of an extra-musical 
kind, i.e., about something other than itself, and as such, it poses a challenge to the formalist. 
His argument for this view is structured in three parts. He agrees with Kivy that music is 
expressive of emotion. However, he departs from Kivy in arguing that music’s capability of 
being expressive of emotion leads to music being capable of arousing emotion. In turn, this 
leads to the view that music represents emotion. And if music represents, then music has 
content or cognitive significance.  
A central hypothesis for this essay is that music has features that make its 
description in emotional terms non-arbitrary. When we apply emotion terms to 
music, we are doing so in a way that is related to the prior application of such 
terms to people and their mental states. … When listeners make an emotional 
statement about music they have detected a property of the music that is closely 
related to properties detected in other contexts in which they use emotion 
predicates.97 
If Young is successful in what he aims to do in this essay, he will have presented a strong 
case against formalism. In addition, he will have presented an interesting alternative. 
Therefore, I will spend a good while discussing his arguments to the end that music is capable 
of (non-trivial) representation. 
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3.2.1 Music as Expressive of Emotion 
 
Young starts off with arguing that his view resonates with the normal way in which we speak 
of the phenomenon in question. We often describe music in emotional terms, and when we do 
this, what we mean is that music is expressive of these emotions. Hence, the attribution of 
emotions to music is usually elliptical. 
A statement such as ‘The symphony is sorrowful and grieving’ is a shorthand, or 
elliptical, way of saying ‘The symphony is expressive of sorrow and grief’. Such a 
statement will be true if, as a matter of empirical fact, the symphony relevantly 
resembles human expressive behaviour. 98 
Young calls his theory (and related theories) of how music can be expressive of emotion 
resemblance theory. At its core, it is more or less the same theory that Peter Kivy used to 
advocate (which he referred to as the contour theory). The central idea is, as described in the 
explication of Kivy’s theories, that music is expressive of emotion due to the resemblance 
between the way people sound and behave when expressing emotion, and the way expressive 
music sounds. As we saw earlier, Kivy does not advocate this theory anymore, yet he has not 
replaced it with another theory of how music can be expressive of emotion, either. He argues 
that we for the time being should look past this question, and treat the mechanism of how 
music is expressive of emotion as a black box.  
We know what comes in, and what comes out, but what causes what goes in to 
produce what comes out – of that we are ignorant. With regard to how music 
comes to exhibit the garden-variety emotions as perceptual qualities, it is to us a 
black box. We know what goes in: the musical features that, for three centuries, 
have been associated with the particular emotions music is expressive of. And we 
know what comes out: the expressive qualities the music is heard to be expressive 
of.99 
Kivy found that the arguments he had offered in defence of the contour theory were not 
convincing to him. He is sceptical of both kinds of analogies from a phenomenological 
viewpoint, it seems; especially the resemblance between the way emotionally affected people 
move and the contour of the music. He sees the crossing of sense-modalities involved in 
hearing something as analogous to the way something looks as problematic. 
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Does it make any sense at all to say that a passage of music is melancholy in 
virtue of sounding the way a human being gestures or movies when he or she is 
melancholy? Can music sound like a gesture or bodily pose? Can sense modalities 
be crossed that way? There is certainly plenty of room for doubt about it.100 
Furthermore, he is sceptical to his own evolutionary explanations, referring to them as what 
the biologist Stephen J. Gould has called “just so stories”.101 In the end, he thinks the theory 
has its attraction, but no longer advocates it, arguing that for the time being we just do not 
have a good explanation of how music can be expressive of emotion. It just is. 
 
Young thinks, however, that the theory is still plausible. Furthermore, he holds that if it is 
true, the consequence is that music is capable of both arousing and representing emotion. 
Young’s argument for the resemblance theory is in large part an empirical one. He refers to a 
wide array of psychological experiments which all seem to indicate that the similarity 
between people expressing emotion (through voice or behaviour) and music expressing 
emotion is widely experienced. The similarities between the voice and music is, not 
surprisingly, the best documented one.  
The empirical evidence for resemblance between music and vocal expression is 
marshalled in a review article by Patrik N. Juslin and Petri Laukka. These authors 
reviewed 140 studies of the human ability to ‘decode’ the expression of emotion 
in vocal expression and in musical performance. The first conclusion to be drawn 
from these studies (one that some formalists would likely not challenge) is that 
people are nearly equally good at determining the emotion expressed in a musical 
performance as they are at discerning what emotion is expressed in spoken words. 
… Even more strikingly, a good deal of evidence suggests that people pick up on 
the same features of speech and music when they judge that either is expressive of 
a given emotion.102 
He goes on to point to some of the features of music and vocal expression that are heard as 
similar between music and speech; the tempo (beats per minute/words per minute), rising or 
falling pitch contour, they can both be loud or soft, varied or constant dynamics, timbre and 
attack. “These features, which appear in both speech and music, are the features that people 
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detect when they discern the expressive content of utterances and music”.103 When these 
features appear in speech and music respectively, the emotions we perceive them as 
expressive of are the same; i.e., a soft, halting tone of voice is associated with negative 
emotion; the same is the case in music. Young concludes that the empirical evidence implies 
that there is a strong connection between the expressivity of human utterance and the 
expressivity of music.  
 
As for the resemblance between the bodily expression of emotion and the musical expression 
of emotion, Kivy expressed concerns about making analogies between different sense-
modalities. This is one of the reasons why he left the contour theory behind. Young says that 
there is now theoretical framework in place to facilitate this kind of cross-domain comparison. 
“The theoretical basis for thinking about parallels between different sensory modalities is also 
now available, particularly in the work of Mark Johnson”.104 Johnson has done work on the 
relation between the way we perceive of music and the way we experience bodies in motion. 
Mark Johnson focuses on three fundamental ways in which we experience 
motion: (1) we see objects move; (2) we move our bodies; and (3) we feel our 
bodies moved by forces. He argues that these three fundamental experiences of 
motion lead us to develop three fundamental ways of conceiving of music.105 
These three ways of experiencing motion accords with three ways of perceiving music as 
moving, as in its tempo increasing or slowing down, as moving through a terrain (we come to 
a place in the music, something is ahead of us or behind us etc.) or as carrying us along, 
transporting us, or lifting our spirits. This alone does not give Young all that he wants. So far, 
he has only established that we speak about music in terms of motion, which does not 
necessarily make for a strong analogy. However, he thinks he finds the evidence he needs in 
an experiment by Manfred Clynes and Nigel Nettheim.106 
The experimenters began by determining the contours of motion associated with 
seven emotions: anger, hate, grief, love, sexual attraction, joy, and reverence. This 
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was done by measuring patterns of finger pressure and asking which patterns of 
finger pressure were associated with each emotion. Anger, for example, was 
characterized by a strong, abrupt spike in pressure followed by an equally abrupt 
release of pressure. Grief is associated with a gradual decline in finger pressure, 
and so on. The researchers then generated patterns of sound with the same 
contours as the patterns of finger pressure. So, for example, it was hypothesized 
that an abrupt upward jump of a minor sixth would be heard as expressive of 
anger, while a gradual decline of about four semi-tones would be experienced as 
expressive of grief. And so it proved. Recordings were made of simple melodies 
with abrupt leaps, gradually falling pitch and so on. Test subjects were reliably 
able to determine, on the basis of contour, the emotion that a recording expressed. 
There was some confusion between love and reverence, as well as between anger 
and hate, but overall subjects were able to discern the emotion each recording 
expressed.107 
This experiment is closer to giving Young what he wants. It establishes a connection between 
the experienced contour of a feeling, and similar heard contours in music. Hence, some of the 
cross-domain comparison is in place. Still, we are not all the way there; remember that the 
conclusion Young wants is that “music is expressive of emotion because it resembles motions 
of our bodies that express emotions”.108 The last piece of the puzzle comes in the form of an 
experiment by Annabel J. Cohen.109 
In this experiment, test subjects were provided with both visual and auditory 
stimuli. The visual stimuli consisted of an animated ball bouncing up and down 
on a screen. The tempo and height of the bounce was varied. Subjects reported 
that the higher the ball bounced and the faster it bounced, the more the ball was 
expressive of happiness. The auditory stimuli consisted of a single repeated note. 
The pitch height and the tempo of the note were varied. Subjects reported that the 
higher the pitch and the faster the tempo, the more the music was expressive of 
happiness.110 
Young calls these cross-domain parallels striking, saying “It seems likely that the perception 
of expressiveness of the auditory stimuli is linked to the expressiveness of certain sorts of 
bodily movement”.111 There is one caveat, though. While this experiment may indicate that 
there are cross-domain similarities in the way we perceive movement and music as being 
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expressive of emotion, it does not necessarily follow. The height of the ball bounce and the 
(so-called) height of the pitch of the note is not the same kind of height. However, we need 
not be sceptics. The resemblance theory seems intuitive enough, and even though the use of 
‘height’ may differ between the two sense modalities, the tempo is still the same kind of 
quality if it is perceived visually or auditory. Furthermore, even if the notion of height used 
about the bouncing of a ball is not the same notion that is used about pitch in music, for the 
results of a psychological experiment, it is perhaps significant enough that we use the same 
word between the sense modalities. Young concludes that the evidence for the resemblance 
between the way emotionally affected people move and the way music is perceived of as 
moving, seems weaker than the evidence for the resemblance between the way emotionally 
affected people sound, and the way music sounds. Still, if we, as Mark Johnson suggests, can 
perceive music in terms of movement, then it seems that music, in some cases, can be 
expressive of emotions in the same way that emotionally affected people move. Sad people 
tend to move slowly, haltingly, dragging along; the same words accurately describe sad 
music. Moreover, I find that in explicitly considering rhythm in this regard, the analogy 
between emotive movement and music is almost just as strong as the analogy between 
emotive speech and music. 
 
With all of this brought together, Young believes that Kivy should not have abandoned the 
resemblance theory of musical expression, and that Kivy makes conventions of musical 
expression do too much work. A lot of what Kivy thinks is conventional is in fact, according 
to Young, just hard-wired. Having grounded the resemblance theory of musical expression in 
empirical data, Young now wants to go on to build upon it a theory of musical arousal, before 
he will use this to argue that absolute music music has cognitively significant content, that 
music alone can say something about something other than itself. 
 
3.2.2 Music Arousing Emotion 
 
Having established that music is expressive of emotion, Young now turns to show how this 
means that music is capable of arousing emotion as well. The standard position for the 
formalist is that music does not arouse emotion. Indeed, for many this is taken to be the core 
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claim of formalism. As we saw, this was certainly the case for Hanslick; and while he had to 
cede some ground in his later years, this was for the most part of his career the position of 
Kivy as well.  
 
Broadly speaking, we have two sides in the debate of whether music arouses emotion or not, 
the arousalists, and the non-arousalists. What is striking is that experiments indicate that 
music arouses emotion in some listeners, while not in others. And frequently those who are in 
favour of arousalism report that music arouses emotion in them, while those who are against 
report that music arouses no emotion in them, or at least not of the garden-variety.  
The reasonable position to take is that both formalists and arousalists sincerely 
and, for the most part, accurately report the effects that music has on them. The 
experimental evidence supports this conclusion. Music seems to have different 
physiological effects on different listeners. This suggests that its emotional effects 
also vary from listener to listener.112 
A possible conclusion from this is that the opposing theories regarding whether music arouses 
emotion in the listener is the result of physiological, rather than intellectual differences 
between their respective proponents. Kivy may just not be susceptible to having emotion 
aroused in him by music, and similarly, Robinson and Young probably do not have emotion 
aroused in them by choice. Ultimately, this helps Young more than Kivy. Young only needs 
there to be some listeners to have emotion aroused by music, as he only claims that it is 
possible. Kivy, on the other hand, needs to explain away these results, arguing that the 
emotions that listeners report having aroused by music are mistaken.  
 
Young finds three different arguments against music arousing emotion, the first two he 
attributes to Kivy, the last one to Hanslick (a similar point is made by Kivy as well). Young 
recreates the first argument against music arousing emotion from Kivy’s work, which Kivy 
thinks is “convincing, if not absolutely conclusive”.113 
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(1) If music arouses emotion, then this arousal has a commonsense explanation (since 
it is an everyday affair). 
(2) There is no commonsensical explanation of the arousal of emotion by music. 
⸫(C) Music does not arouse emotion.114 
Kivy argues this from the fact that the common arousal of emotion, for instance if his Uncle 
Charlie told lies about his Aunt Bella, it would be straightforwardly understandable to 
everyone why he got angry. He got angry with Charlie because he told lies about Bella. We 
may go into deeper psychological detail to explain the mechanisms and further reasons for 
him being angry with Uncle Charlie, but we do not need to. There is no real mystery about 
why Kivy is angry with Charlie. With music however, we do not have this kind of 
straightforward explanation. Kivy does not believe that there is a folk-psychological way of 
explaining the arousal of emotion by music. And since we encounter music as often as we do, 
such a folk-psychological explanation should exist, if it was actually the case that music 
arouses emotion. This leads Kivy to suspect that music does not arouse emotion in the 
listener.  
 
According to Young, the first premise seem to rely on us accepting the following principle: 
(P) Any commonplace event has a commonsense explanation.115 
This principle does not seem to be absolutely true. Young would see it rather as expressing a 
high probability. 
(P’) Any commonplace event likely has a commonsense explanation.116 
However, since there are a lot of commonplace events in the natural world that require quite 
difficult explanations, Young thinks it will be even more charitable to read it as: 
 (P’’) Any ordinary mental event likely has a commonsense explanation.117 
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But even stated like this, we can see that this premise does not hold. There are, for instance, 
no commonsense explanations for the way our will interacts with our bodies, and this seems 
like one of the most ordinary of ordinary events. There may be a commonsense explanation 
for why Kivy gets angry with his Uncle Charlie. But if Kivy decided to speak up to his uncle, 
and tell him off for telling self-serving lies, then there is not really a folk-psychological 
explanation for how he got from making the decision to tell Charlie off, to actually make an 
utterance. Still, that there is no everyday-explanation of it does not seem to astonish Aunt 
Bella, or any of the others present. This is likely because Kivy’s premise that ordinary events 
have commonsense explanations is wrong. Of course, some ordinary events do. But clearly, 
not all of them. Even if the premise held, though, we may point out that large numbers of 
people do experience that their emotions are aroused by music. After all, composers have, for 
a long time, employed different compositional techniques just to this effect. And people 
untrained in music theory describe music, and the way music makes them feel, in emotional 
terms, seemingly without a sense of bafflement. If it was not commonly held that music 
sometimes aroused emotion in the listener, people would probably find themselves shocked 
when moved to tears by a piece of music. It seems then, that our understanding of the 
phenomenon of music arousing emotion in the listener is not any worse off than many other 
completely ordinary phenomena, such as how our will can affect our bodies. Hence, we can 
safely disregard this argument from Kivy. 
 
The second of Kivy’s arguments against music arousing emotion is that we do not react to 
emotions the way we usually do when we (supposedly) have emotions aroused in us by 
music. The arousal of emotion in everyday life is usually accompanied by behaviour typical 
for the emotion we are feeling. This does not seem to be the case when we (supposedly) have 
emotions aroused by music. For instance, if I listen to scary music, it does not cause me to be 
frightened, at least not so much that I flee from the concert hall. In general, we do not respond 
to music with behaviour characteristic of any emotion.118 This leads Kivy to conclude that 
music does not arouse emotion. Young answers that, first, Kivy allows that literature can 
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arouse emotion. Still, we typically do not react by running around, and screaming, having 
read a horror novel.119 Literature arouses emotion in the reader, but we do not take what we 
read literally. Thus, our behavioural responses to literature are different to our behavioural 
responses to everyday emotions. Young concludes from this that it seems possible to feel the 
garden-variety emotions, without displaying the associated behaviour. If we can feel emotion 
without necessarily displaying the associated behaviour, then it seems like Kivy’s argument 
fails. Second, Young thinks that we actually do have behavioural responses to music. “When 
we hear certain forms of music we are moved to dance for joy or to play air guitar. If we 
happen to be in a concert hall, we will be discrete and quietly tap our toes or nod our 
heads”.120 The behaviour displayed may not be of the same kind as if we felt the emotions in 
daily life, but this should probably be expected. When the stimuli responsible for the emotion 
is not of the same kind, it is not surprising that the reaction is not the same.  
 
The third argument, traced back to Hanslick, springs out of the cognitive theory of emotion. 
Crudely stated, the cognitive theory of emotion holds that “several conditions must be met in 
order for someone to be in an emotional state. Most importantly, in order to be in an 
emotional state, a person must have certain beliefs about some object”.121 Hence, in addition 
to the phenomenal aspect of fearfulness or sadness, I must believe that I am in danger to feel 
fear, or believe that something bad has occurred to feel sad, etc. Music can perhaps arouse 
these phenomenal aspects of emotion in us, but it cannot cause us to have the relevant beliefs. 
Part and parcel of this position is the view that emotions are more than 
phenomenological states and emotions cannot be distinguished by reference to 
their phenomenological characters alone. The distinction between, for example, 
sadness and tenderness lies not in the ‘feel’ of the emotional state, but in the 
object towards which it is directed and the beliefs the agent has about that 
object.122 
Young does not meet this argument head on, saying that he does not want to be drawn into a 
discussion of theories of emotion. He mentions only in passing that the cognitive theory of 
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emotion is not universally accepted. Crucially, this argument will depend upon whether the 
cognitive theory of emotion is true or not. Young can be seen to start at the other end, though; 
instead of discussing the cognitive theory of emotion, he goes on to discuss the empirical 
evidence supporting that music does arouse emotion. And, if music in fact arouses emotion, it 
is a chance that it is because the cognitive theory of emotion does not hold (the alternative 
being that it is because music is the kind of objects we can form relevant beliefs about). 
 
Peter Kivy has put forward a theory of emotion similar to the cognitive theory. In his version, 
he is careful to stress that this is the way emotions often work and that his theory as such does 
not claim generality. 
[I]n many of the ordinary cases of having an emotion, there is an object of the 
emotion, a belief or set of beliefs that causes the emotion, and causes it to have the 
object it does, and a certain feeling aroused in the one experiencing the emotion. 
This is not to say that there cannot be cases where emotion has no apparent object, 
or no apparent belief associated causally with it. The word ‘emotion’ covers a lot 
of ground.123 
Kivy calls this the object-belief-feeling analysis of emotion. At heart it is the cognitive theory 
of emotion, but by only claiming that this is how emotions work most of the time, he is able 
to hold that object- and belief-less emotions are possible. It means that Kivy cannot use the 
above argument against the arousalist, but it may be a better fit with how we experience the 
world than the cognitive theory. It seems like object- and/or belief-less emotions are 
possible.124 
 
Young goes on to point to empirical evidence that seem to indicate that music does arouse 
emotion. He stresses that we do not need to know how music arouses emotion, to know that 
music arouses emotion. Furthermore, he thinks that proving that music arouses emotion in 
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listeners is straightforward; it can be settled by self-reporting. So, we just need to ask people 
whether they have emotion aroused by music, and we should be able to trust the answer they 
give. And people have been asked, and a significant amount (though not everyone), have 
reported that they have emotions aroused by music.125 Young concludes from the available 
evidence that music arouses emotion, at least in some listeners.126 And this is all that the 
arousalist needs. If some listeners have emotion aroused by music, then it is not true that 
music cannot arouse emotion. In turn, this emotional arousal becomes the foundation on 
which he builds the representational aspect of music. 
 
Peter Kivy gradually moved away from his strong anti-arousalist viewpoint. In the end, he 
accepted that music arouses emotion in some cases, however, when it does, it is not 
aesthetically relevant.127 
In his most recent writings, Kivy holds that music arouses emotion in some 
listeners but not in others. People who listen to music as an aesthetic object do not 
have emotions aroused. He holds that such people are the ‘informed’ and 
‘devoted’ music lovers. Music arouses emotion in people who listen to it in 
another way. It may, for example, arouse emotion in a child whose mother sings 
to it in a soothing tone of voice. Perhaps music arouses emotion in dancers. In 
neither case is music arousing emotions in listeners who are paying close attention 
to it as an aesthetic object and nothing else.128 
This, which Young refers to as a last ditch effort from Kivy to hold that music does not (need 
to) arouse emotion in the listener, seems to bring Kivy back to Kant (or a possible reading of 
Kant at any rate). Music conceived as an aesthetic object in the manner Kivy does above, 
seems to presuppose a kind of disinterestedness in the object. Young has two responses to this 
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position. First, it comes very close to being tautological; “Kivy seems to be saying that 
listening that does not arouse emotion does not arouse emotion [Sic]. That is certainly true, 
but completely uninformative”.129 Second, we may try to listen to a work of music in a 
manner that does not arouse emotion, and to some degree be successful. To Young, however, 
and I think to many others of us as well, it seems like listening to music in this manner is 
overlooking part of what is great about music. The emotions aroused by music, in addition to 
actually happening, contrary to Kivy’s beliefs, also seem to be the source of part of the 
pleasure many people take in listening to music. An understanding of music that completely 
disregards one of the parts that regularly is cited as part of what is enjoyable about music, 
seems to be an understanding that is lacking. 
 
We can try to give Kivy a Kantian line of defence here. We remember that for Kant we need 
to disregard the colour and tone, and recognise the form of the object in order to make a pure 
aesthetic judgment of it. For Kivy, conceding that music under some circumstances can 
arouse emotion, either by convention or the “colour” or sentimentality of the tone (or timbre, 
etc.), may not be a big defeat at all. As Young points out, people who have emotions aroused 
by music may simply not be attending to it correctly as an aesthetic object. The feeling of 
exhilaration, or excitement, i.e., what Kivy calls the specifically musical feeling, may be seen 
to be the pleasure we feel in judging an object as beautiful. Kivy’s resulting position may be a 
little demanding on the listener, as the listener would be required to have a basic knowledge 
of structural conventions in music, but only to the degree that one would need to learn some 
music theory to fully appreciate music as an aesthetic object. And that requirement may 
perhaps not be any more demanding than requiring people to be able to read, and understand 
some basic conventions of literature, to fully aesthetically appreciate a novel. Young says that 
Kivy is missing something in not taking the arousal of emotion into account when listening to 
music, that he does not get the whole picture. But against this background, the Kantian Kivy 
seems to be able to reply that the true enjoyment comes from attending correctly to music as 
an aesthetic object, not merely by getting swayed by the sentimentality and charm of the 
tones. 
                                                 




It seems, then, that Kivy could have mustered another line of defence against these arguments 
from Young. Ultimately, though, it comes back to the observation Young makes on the back 
of the psychological research that indicates that some people just have emotion aroused by 
music, while others just do not. The argument between these two sides are based on 
fundamentally different experiences of music. These two sides can never fully understand 
each other, as it would require them to experience the world in another way than they do. 
Kivy and Hanslick (and other formalists) do not have garden-variety emotions aroused by 
music. Young and Robinson (and other arousalists) do. Theoretically speaking, however, the 
arousalists have the upper hand here, as they only require that the arousal of emotion by 
music is possible. So, if some people actually have emotion aroused by music, then Young 
can go on with his project, to show that music can be representative as well. And, the 
evidence seems to imply that emotional arousal by music does occur, at least for some. 
Hence, we can move on to Young’s account of musical representation. 
 
3.2.3 Music as Representation 
 
For Young, the crucial difference between the formalist and the anti-formalist, is that the anti-
formalist thinks that music can be a source of knowledge about something extra-musical. As 
we have already seen, Young does not want to speak of meaning in connection with music, as 
he wants to reserve that term for a specifically linguistic context. The term he ends up with is 
representation, as representations can have cognitive significance, and thus be a source of 
knowledge, without having to be either true or false. Young holds that if music is capable of 
representation, then it has content. And, if music has content, then formalism is false. 
Furthermore, he believes that if music is capable of arousing and being expressive of emotion 
as he has shown, then, music necessarily also must be capable of representing. Young thinks 
that musical works can represent both the expression of emotion and the arousal of emotion. 
He notes that the kind of representation he is discussing here is external representation, not 
mental representation. The representations he discusses then, are things made by humans, not 
vorstellungen (or forestillinger) of a mental kind. He gives a list of conditions that must be 
fulfilled in order for something to be a representation: 
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(I) The content condition: if R is a representation, then one can acquire knowledge 
from R about the object it represents.  
(II) The intentionality condition: if R is a representation, then someone intends that it 
have cognitive significance. 
(III) The accessibility condition: audience members who are distinct from the person 
who intended that R be a representation, must be able to recognize the cognitive 
significance of R.130  
Young then makes a further division of the external representation into semantic 
representation and illustrative representation. Semantic representation is found in language.  
True sentences are the most familiar examples of semantic representation. For 
example, ‘Mozart had blue eyes’ is a semantic representation. Speakers can intend 
to use it to convey the knowledge that Mozart had blue eyes. Such a 
representation depends on semantic conventions that assign specific referents to a 
finite set of words and which specify rules for generating semantic 
representations.131 
Semantic representations are what, in Young’s opinion, can convey meaning. Semantic 
representations have truth values, they can be true or false, and Young, in a Fregean spirit, 
thinks that this is what constitutes meaning proper. Therefore, he argues, music cannot have 
meaning, as music does not do semantic representation. The relevant kind of representation 
for music then is the other kind, illustrative representation.132 
Illustrations convey information since experiences of them are relevantly similar 
to the object they represent. A swatch of fabric is an illustrative representation. … 
It represents the rest of the cloth in the bolt because experience of the swatch is 
similar to experience of the rest of the cloth. Pictures are also examples of 
illustrations. A painting illustrates Mozart only if experience of the painting is 
relevantly similar to experience of the composer. Crucially, the sort of 
representation found in music is illustration.133 
Musical illustration of sounds is uncontroversial. Music can illustratively represent birdsong, 
church bells, trains and a variety of other sounds. In most of these cases, though, the 
illustration of sound is trivial. This is especially the case if one, like Kivy, thinks that this is 
the only kind of representation music is capable of. Yes, the sounds point to something extra-
musical, but we do not learn anything new about birds or churches or trains from the 
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illustration. Young holds, though, that music can also illustrate how emotions feel; thus, we 
can learn something about emotions from listening to music, because the experience of music 
is relevantly similar to experience of emotion.  
 
Music, then, can represent emotion in two ways, either representing the expression of emotion 
or represent emotion by arousing emotion. In the first, and according to Young least 
interesting manner, music represents emotion by being expressive of emotion. 
(1) Some works of music are intended by their composers to be heard as expressive 
of emotion. 
(2) Some works of music are heard by qualified listeners as expressive of emotion. 
(3) A work of music heard as expressive of emotion has cognitive significance. 
(4) If some works of music are intended by their composers to be heard as expressive 
of emotion, these works of music are heard by qualified listeners as expressive of 
emotion and these works of music heard as expressive of emotion has cognitive 
significance, then works of music represent the expression of emotion. 
⸫(C)Works of music represent the expression of emotion.134 
This argument is intended to show a way in which some music satisfies the three conditions 
for representation. Through (1) it satisfies the intention condition, through (2) it satisfies the 
accessibility condition, and through (3) it satisfies the knowledge condition, since things that 
have cognitive significance can be a source of knowledge to us. (4) expresses that some music 
satisfies all the conditions for being representational, which leads to the conclusion that some 
works of music represent the expression of emotion. However, Young thinks that the 
knowledge we can gain from the representation of expression of emotion is rather trivial. “We 
can learn that sadness is expressed by slow, plodding motion, and that joy is expressed by 
quick, bouncing motion. We can learn that a high, piercing note expresses fear and anguish. 
In short, listeners can learn about the expression of emotion”.135 If this were all that were to 
be gained from representation in music, the anti-formalist would not seem to have an 
advantage over the formalist, as it does not seem that there is much more to learn from 
representation of this kind, than what we could learn from music representing sounds.  
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More interestingly, though, Young believes that music can also represent the arousal of 
emotion. 
(1) Some works of music are intended by composers to arouse emotion. 
(2) These works of music arouse in qualified listeners the emotions that composers 
intend to arouse.  
(3) By arousing emotion, these works of music have cognitive significance. 
(4) If composers intend their works to arouse emotion in listeners, the works arouse 
in listeners the emotions that composers intend, and by arousing emotions the 
works of music have cognitive significance, then some works of music represent 
emotion. 
⸫(C) Some works of music represent emotion.136 
Again, the premises are intended to show a way that some music satisfies the conditions for 
representation. In this case, it is the arousal of emotion that does the job. The reason that 
Young finds this kind of musical representation more interesting than music representing the 
expression of emotion is that music representing the arousal of emotion opens up the 
possibility that listening to music can give us knowledge of our emotions, both ones we have 
already felt, new shades of already experienced emotions, and new ones altogether, which 
many claim is the kind of content music has. In his description of this kind of content he is 
echoing Mendelssohn’s words, that what is expressed in music is not too indefinite for words, 
but rather too definite. 
The content or cognitive significance of a work of music lies, in large part, in 
knowledge of the precise shades of emotion that it arouses. Hearing a piece of 
music, listeners come to know what experience of certain emotions are like by 
feeling those emotions. Listeners can also come to have knowledge about what it 
is like to experience certain patterns of emotion. By representing patterns of 
emotion, music can also represent character.137 
The suggestion that music can represent character may make his position seem like it is 
approaching the persona theory, and thus, narrativism. Young himself is adamant that this is 
not the case. He does not find the idea of hearing a persona expressing emotions in a work of 
music intuitively convincing, and furthermore  
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I know of no empirical evidence that this is true. The empirical evidence strongly 
suggests that listeners feel joy, melancholy, and a variety of other emotions as 
they listen to music. This evidence does not also indicate that listeners experience 
the joy or melancholy as the joy or melancholy of anyone in particular.138 
If there is no persona, narrativism fails. Narration requires an agent in order for there to be a 
story at all. Music becomes more like still-life paintings or lyric poems in Young’s view; it 
represents something, but it is not telling a story. Without text, music can only represent a 
series of emotions in general, not the emotions of a particular person.  
 
Young, then, disagrees strongly with the formalist claim that absolute music is “instrumental 
music without text, title, programme or any other semantic, narrative or representational 
content”.139 He believes that music has content through the representation of emotion. His 
view is similar to many others who claim that music has meaning, but Young is reluctant to 
use the word meaning in connection with other phenomena than language. In this regard, he 
follows Kivy. 
While music has content, it does not have meaning; that is, it has no semantic 
content. Such content depends on the existence of semantic conventions and these 
do not exist in the case of music. In the absence of semantic conventions in music, 
the representation in music cannot be semantic representation. Works of music 
cannot make statements whose meanings can be understood.140 
The content, or cognitive significance that music can have, then, according to Young, is that 
music can represent the arousal of emotion, from which we can learn something about 
emotions. We can learn about emotions that we have already experienced, and we can 
possibly learn something about new emotions as well. Music can even represent character, 
insofar as character can be represented as a succession of emotions. For instance, he holds 
that Liszt’s Faust Symphony sketches the characters of Faust, Gretchen and 
Mephistopheles.141 In the end, then, Young believes that he has thoroughly rebutted 
formalism. If he in fact has shown beyond doubt that music is capable of representing 
emotion, and thus has cognitive content, then this is most certainly true. As he writes in the 
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envoi, Young believes that this conclusion is important for music. Formalism potentially 
reduces music to intellectual puzzles, or something that pleases the sensations. Rebutting 
formalism and showing that music can provide a deeper, more meaningful experience than the 
perfumer or creator of chess problems can (i.e., neither purely sensual nor purely intellectual), 
seems like a service to music.142 
 
There are some potential problems in Young’s account, however. Even though he has shown 
that music does arouse emotion in the listener, he does not show that it is aesthetically 
relevant. Both Hanslick and Kivy are willing to concede that music under certain 
circumstances can arouse emotion in the listener, but they hold that this has no bearing on 
music as an aesthetic object. In fact, both Robinson and Kivy seem to be able to account for 
the connection between emotion and the aesthetic value better than Young does, as they both 
stress the fundamental structural role emotion play in music. Another potential problem for 
Young may be that, if psychological insight of the kind he is describing is the main 
significance we can draw from music, then the majority of musical works may be left without 
cognitive significance. As Theodore Gracyk notes in his review of the book: 
…Young’s explanation of this kind of insight is tied to a handful of works in the 
classical tradition. I can find nothing here to block the conclusion that most music 
does not provide a high degree of psychological insight and so, on his account, 
most music is of limited cognitive and aesthetical value.143 
This is indeed not a welcome conclusion from a work that tries to show the cognitive 
significance music can have.  
 
The main thing I draw from Young’s work is the empirical evidence that he amasses against 
formalism. The evidence suggests strongly that music is capable of arousing emotion. The 
burden, then, is placed on the formalist to show either; that people are wrong in their reports, 
or, that the emotions aroused are not aesthetically relevant. Both Young and Robinson give 
plausible accounts of how emotion can have aesthetic relevance, though Robinson’s account 
                                                 
142 James O. Young, Critique of Pure Music, p. 182. 
143 Theodore Gracyk, “Critique of Pure Music, by James O. Young”, p. 404. 
 
 69 
on this point seems stronger. Young’s notion of music being illustratively representative is 
interesting, but it may account for just a small number of works. 
 
Robinson’s narrativism emerges as the strongest alternative so far. My problem with her 
theory is that I do not think that what we hear in the music, is not a narrative in a literal sense. 
If we, however, construe this narrative less literally, her account matches better with at least 
my own experience of listening to music. This can be done, I believe, by seeing narratives in 
light of Aaron Ridley’s use of the Wittgensteinian notion of paraphrase.  
 
3.3 Aaron Ridley: Paraphrase 
 
There are two main points I want to draw out of Aaron Ridley’s work. First, his discussion of 
music as absolute or pure, directly contends with Kivy’s idea of absolute music, and will 
serve to clarify some further problems of Kivy’s conception of absolute music. Second, his 
thoughts on understanding music in light of the term paraphrase, will help us understand 
Robinson’s and Young’s attempts to explicate what can be considered meaning or cognitive 
significance in music. Ridley calls the paraphraseable and non-paraphraseable aspects of 
understanding the external understanding and internal understanding. What he wants to show 
is merely that external understanding is possible. Ridley does not, however, want to deny that 
we understand music internally as well. I have, in the end, some misgivings about his views, 
but his analysis of how the paraphraseable and the non-paraphraseable uses of words together 
makes up our understanding will be important for my own view on meaning in music. 
 
Robinson and Young accept Kivy’s conclusion that music does not have meaning, since it 
does not have a semantic dimension. Ridley does not address the question directly, rather, he 
challenges what he sees as the common view of language among philosophers of music, 
meaning atomism. Instead of saying straight out that music can have a semantic dimension, he 
follows Wittgenstein in saying that understanding music and language is much more akin than 




3.3.1 Absolute Music as a Pure Isotope 
 
As we have seen, absolute music is usually used as the paradigm case in contemporary 
discussions in the philosophy of music. The tendency to isolate the purely musical for study, 
has its roots in Hanslick. 
If some general definition of music be sought, something by which to characterize 
its essence and its nature, to establish its boundaries and purpose, we are entitled 
to confine ourselves to instrumental music. Of what instrumental music cannot do, 
it ought never be said that music can do, because only instrumental music is music 
purely and absolutely.144 
Eduard Hanslick wrote this well over a hundred years ago, and up until recently it has been 
the prevailing view in the philosophy of music. The idea is simple and efficient. We want to 
know what powers music has qua music. Therefore, we remove everything that is not music, 
and analyse it. What we find, then, is what powers music has on its own. In many cases, this 
is a perfectly valid way of proceeding. If we want to know whether there is semantic meaning 
in music, for example, it would be hard to tell if we listen to a musical work with lyrics or 
with an attached programme. The work could be a treasure trove of semantic meaning, but we 
could not know what came from the music, and what came from the words. After all, even if 
music had its own semantics, the semantics of regular language is so much clearer that it 
would probably overshadow whatever the musical semantics said. So, we focus on 
instrumental, non-programmatic works instead. In the specific case of whether music has 
semantics, this kind of approach seems to make sense.  
 
Ridley sees this approach to understanding music as being modelled on the proceedings of the 
natural sciences. Music is made into an object of study, and, where it is not pure enough, we 
disregard whatever extra-musical implications may be there. Ridley criticises this route of 
trying to gain knowledge about music. While he does not have any misgivings with a 
scientific study of music, or trying to gain (in some sense) objective knowledge about music, 
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he believes that the way music theorists, philosophers of music, etc. has gone about to this 
end has been scientistic, rather than scientific.  
 
He argues that philosophers of music, like Kivy, have tried to find a pure isotope of music to 
be studied, in the same manner that we would use distilled water in experiments to find the 
pressure levels in boiling water. The problem is not the scientific approach to isolate the 
relevant elements of music, but the fact that we isolate the wrong parts, or too much. Hence, a 
good deal of philosophers of music look past the historical and cultural aspects of music, to be 
able to study it in its pure form. They disregard programmes, titles and biographical 
information, or the reception history of the work. Thus, Ridley thinks that the pure music they 
end up with is, in a sense, too pure. While they are trying to study music objectively, they are 
in fact misconstruing the object. 
Objectivity is a matter of getting the object right. If the object of enquiry is 
historically constituted, as for instance nationalism is, then objectivity depends on 
not ruling out the vagaries of time and place. If the object is culturally constituted, 
as to different degrees sex and cookery are, objectivity requires the human 
element. The error of scientism is to imagine that because water, say, lacks a 
history or a culture in the relevant sense, and because science attempts to factor 
such things out accordingly, objectivity must by its very nature be ahistorical and 
acultural. But that is to mistake one injunction for another. One should exclude 
the irrelevant, by all means; but one shouldn’t therefore exclude it by irrelevant 
standards of relevance.145 
The notion of absolute music seems to be of this kind. When Kivy construes music as a 
“quasi-syntactical structure of sound understandable solely in musical terms”, 146 Ridley will 
argue that he is excluding relevant parts of music. Works that are understandable only in 
terms of internal relations in the music are few. In most cases, historical and cultural factors 
are important as well. The prominent place absolute music has in the debates of the 
philosophy of music overestimates how widespread it is. It may also lead us to consider as 
absolute music many works which are not.  
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3.3.2 Meaning Atomism 
 
It is a widely accepted view that music, even though it bears some resemblance to language, is 
indeed not a language. This, in turn, has led to scepticism regarding any comparison between 
music and language. Ridley believes that this is one step too far, that there is something to 
learn from this kind of comparison, both about music and about language. 
Wittgenstein once remarked, although not in the hearing of most philosophers of 
music, that ‘understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme 
in music than one might think’; and the corollary of this, if it’s true, is that 
understanding a theme in music may be much more akin to understanding a 
sentence than most philosophers of music, at any rate, have been willing to 
concede.147 
The problem from the perspective of the philosophers of music, he believes, is that they often 
seem to be overly confident that they have a proper grasp on what language is, and 
furthermore, often seems to presuppose what Ridley refers to as meaning atomism.  
Thus, on this conception, the meaning of the sentence ‘The chair is blue’ is simply 
an additive function of the meanings of the words ‘the’, ‘chair’, ‘is’ and ‘blue’. 
The words themselves are basic units, or ‘atoms’, of meaning, while sentences 
and other complex expressions mean what they mean in virtue of the atoms 
arranged within them. According to meaning-atomism, then, understanding a 
sentence is a matter of analysing it into and understanding its constituent parts.148 
What seems worth noting here is that what Ridley refers to as meaning atomism, looks a lot 
like what is commonly referred to in the philosophy of language as The Principle of 
Compositionality (PC), which is widely held today. That a Wittgensteinian account of 
language is critical of meaning atomism is not surprising, but Ridley does not give a good 
argument for why meaning atomism fails. Thus, I will have to give an example of a possible 
argument against meaning atomism, to be able to continue the reasoning here. One objection 
could be that meaning atomism requires that all words have a fixed meaning.149 Even though 
virtually no one would deny that context is important in determining the meaning of a 
sentence, one could object that the meaning atomist would require that each separate word of 
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a sentence have a sort of basic or minimal meaning that is not context dependent. However, 
we can make a word mean almost anything that we want to (through for instance stipulative 
acts). Hence, meaning atomism cannot hold, as words themselves seem to be radically context 
dependent. Whether it is an argument along these lines Ridley has in mind, I do not know, but 
it will allow us to continue with the present discussion.150 
 
3.3.3 Showing Understanding: Paraphrasing Music 
 
To Ridley, paraphrase is a constituent part of understanding. To be able to express our 
understanding of something, is to be able to paraphrase it. In order to understand how 
paraphrase applies to music, Ridley first elaborates on how paraphrase works as applied to 
language. “Wittgenstein’s claim, in a nutshell, is that the concept of ‘understanding’, as it 
applies to language, is made up of two aspects: one having to do with the paraphraseable, the 
other with the non-paraphraseable, uses of words”.151 The range of what counts as paraphrase 
is wide in Ridley’s view.  
At the extremely minimal end of the range, one might describe as paraphrase the 
substitution of a word by a synonym (e.g., of ‘feline’ by ‘cat-like’). Or, more 
elaborately, a paraphrase might involve someone stating a point he has stated 
before, but now from a quite different perspective. And more elaborately still, a 
paraphrase might consist in something like a full-blown analysis or explanation, 
as when someone attempts to produce an exegesis or a commentary upon a 
complicated text or position.152 
Furthermore, he holds that the more elaborate forms of paraphrase depend on the less 
elaborate, and as such, a discussion of the minimal forms of paraphrase, as substitution, will 
suffice to get a grasp on the term. Ridley’s minimal conception of paraphrase is that it is built 
around the idea of instrumental intersubstitutability. On this view we use language as a tool to 
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achieve something (broadly speaking), hence it is instrumental. Intersubstitutability describes 
our ability to state the same thing with different words. If I know that you have back 
problems, and want to caution you before you lift a heavy chair, I can say that “That chair is 
heavy”, but the phrase “That piece of furniture is relatively weighty” might as well do the 
trick. And if you (for some strange reason) do not understand what I mean by any of these 
two phrases, I can come up with a third one (“That thing you are about to lift up is not at all 
light”) which expresses the same end that I want to achieve. “The paraphraseable use, then, 
suggests words wielded like tools, and wielded in that way when the context they’re used in is 
already understood instrumentally”.153 This may be close to a trivial point; if I want 
something done, it does not matter which words I use to get them done, as long as the words 
can do the job. In this sense, my aim is specifiable independently of the means I use to bring it 
about. 
 
Ridley identifies a potential problem with this notion of paraphrase; it seems circular. What I 
want to achieve is specifiable independently of the words I use. This is the instrumental part 
of instrumental intersubstitutability. However, any attempt I make specifying my aims in 
other words than those I used, turns out to be paraphrase (which is instrumental 
intersubstitutability). If I say, “That chair is heavy”, and you ask me to explain what I mean, I 
will paraphrase, saying, “That piece of furniture is relatively weighty”. These two sentences 
say the same thing in different ways. But if you ask me, subsequently, what it is that both 
sentences say, I cannot tell you that without saying it in a third manner, paraphrasing again. 
And were you to ask me again, “what is the thing that the third sentence is saying that the first 
two are also saying”, I would have to come up with a fourth way of saying it, and so on, and 
so on ad infinitum. “So it would seem that the analysis of paraphrase in terms of instrumental 
intersubstitutability is circular: paraphrase presupposes instrumentality, the analysis suggests, 
but then instrumentality turns out to presuppose paraphrase”.154 However, Ridley believes that 
this should not lead us to believe that the whole idea of paraphrase is incoherent. On his view, 
the idea of paraphrase is a constitutive part of what it is to understand something. That the 
concepts of instrumentality and paraphrase presuppose each other should not be surprising. If 
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we see the paraphrase as language used as a tool (hence instrumentally), and recognise that 
instrumentality is the means to an end, Ridley thinks it is obvious that these concepts rest 
upon each other. “[F]or the very idea of an ‘end’ to be achieved through the use of ‘means’ 
would be unintelligible, in any intelligible instance of tool-use, were the ends not conceived at 
least partly as the product of end-producing means. That we can use tools at all depends on 
this”.155 What he seems to say, then, is that the aim of knocking some nails into a plank is 
specifiable independently of a hammer. First, we could use other tools (a nail gun, or the heel 
of a shoe). Second, our aim of having some nails in a plank does not require us imagining a 
hammer; we know what we want to do first, then we try to choose the right tool for the job. In 
this sense, the end is specifiable independently from the tool. However, we cannot see our 
fulfilment of this end completely independent of the use of tools. When we reach our goal, it 
is as a result of tool-use. Hence, the end, when attained, has to be understood partly as the 
product of end-producing means. The nails in the plank are, partly, the product of the 
hammer. Again, this may seem trivial, but it has a bearing on Ridley’s notion of paraphrase. 
 
In the end, though, paraphrase is not enough to constitute understanding on its own. As we 
have seen above, there is a possibility of an endless stream of deferred paraphrases in trying 
to understand something. At some point something needs to fall into place, if we are ever 
going to have any kind of understanding. If you do not understand “That chair is heavy”, or 
“That piece of furniture is relatively weighty”, or “That thing you are about to lift up is not at 
all light”, I just have to be creative and keep going with the paraphrases. Suddenly, though, I 
say “No feather, that rocker”, and something clicks into place in you. You understand what 
this phrase means. This, in turn, enables you to understand what the other phrases I used 
meant as well.  
Meaning has here been earthed, and the circle of deferral broken. This second 
aspect of the concept ‘understanding’, then, the aspect relevant to the non-
paraphraseable use of words, turns out to be essential to the understanding of 
paraphrase as well. If all understanding were merely understanding of 
paraphraseable content, after all, understanding itself could never begin: there 
would be no way to break into the endless circle of deferral. But once earthed, in 
the non-periphrastic grasp of a particular expression, understanding becomes 
possible – and so as a corollary, does paraphrase. If you’ve understood ‘No 
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feather, that rocker’ you’ll now be able to offer paraphrases of it, to say the same 
thing in different ways.156 
Ridley does not try to explain how we come to understanding in this manner; rather, he seems 
to count on our experience of coming to an understanding in the way described. To show that 
we have understood something, we employ the paraphraseable use of words. But to be able to 
paraphrase we must have understood what at least one instance of the paraphrases means. 
That is the non-paraphraseable use of words in play. The words mean just what they mean.157 
 
For the present purposes, I can accept Ridley’s notion of the non-paraphraseable use of words, 
on grounds of my experience. It is not an account of how we come to have an understanding 
founded in the sentence; rather, it just states that it occurs. The non-paraphraseable use of 
words turns out to be important in the aesthetic, and looking into the way non-
paraphraseability works in the arts will make the concept somewhat easier to understand. In 
poetry, for instance, there is a sense in which the specific words that are used, and what 
position they are in, seem intrinsically connected to what the poem expresses. There is no 
completely accurate way to paraphrase a poem, as it seems that we cannot change the words 
and still convey the same thing. “[W]e understand the words not as instrumentally 
intersubstitutable for others, or not primarily, but simply as saying what they say”.158 A work 
of art does not try to communicate anything other than itself. This is not meant in the sense 
that a work of art cannot have content that has something relevant to say about the world. The 
point is that a work of art has to express what it does express in exactly that manner, and, it is 
understood in this way. If I read a poem with a political slant, and subsequently tell the poet 
that, “you could have far more efficiently expressed the point you tried to make by writing a 
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pamphlet”, I would have misunderstood the poem. What I said may well be true, of course, 
but I would still display a total lack of understanding of what a poem is.  
 
In the aesthetic sphere, then, it seems like the aspect of paraphrase in understanding becomes 
second in importance to the aspect of non-paraphraseable use of words. We can, of course 
paraphrase a poem in order to show that we have understood it, but the paraphrase would not 
work in the same manner that it would in the case of the instrumental use of language. When 
we paraphrase a poem, we are not saying the same thing in different words, but we can 
express our understanding of it with different words than the ones used in the poem. Or 
rather, even if our paraphrase captures the semantic meaning of the poem, we would argue 
that some of the meaning would still be lost. Ultimately, both notions of understanding are 
needed to make up the full concept, according to Ridley. Therefore, we should not see the 
paraphraseable and the non-paraphraseable notions of understanding as separate concepts, 
but, rather, as two constituent parts of the full concept of understanding. To Ridley, we cannot 
have one and not the other; they are interdependent.  
 
Ridley believes that this view of understanding applies not only to understanding language, 
but also to understanding as such, and that usually context dictates which aspect of 
understanding is to do the heavy lifting. Having prepared the ground with an analysis of 
language and then other kinds of art, he is now ready to apply this view of understanding to 
music. His hope seems to be that a better understanding of language (one that is not meaning-
atomistic) will facilitate our understanding of Wittgenstein’s remark that understanding a 
sentence should be thought of as understanding a musical phrase, and as such, also the other 
way around. For this purpose, he introduces the terminology internal for the non-
paraphraseable use (expressed only by these words in this position) and external for the 
paraphraseable use (can be replaced by another sentence that says the same).159 
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Understanding music in the internal sense is relatively straightforward; it can be seen as the 
formal analysis of music, the discussion of the internal, structural relations of music. There is 
no controversy in claiming that music can be understood internally, as it is the most common 
way of describing and trying to understand music at present. Questions of why this key is 
chosen here instead of that key, why the pattern of the bass stands in this or that relation to the 
melody, etc., are answered by reference to the rest of the work. The internal understanding is 
also an understanding that the theme of a work has to be exactly that theme, in order for the 
work to be the work that it is. This is the non-paraphraseable notion of meaning at work. 
This kind of point is … precisely the kind that philosophers of music have always 
wanted to make, and they have made it well and persuasively. Of interest to me 
here, though, is the way in which the work that has been done on musical 
understanding has also tended to take its purview – which is to say, internal 
understanding – to be the whole vista. One does not, after all, have to deny flatly 
that an external understanding of something is possible in order to show that an 
internal understanding is possible too, and is possibly more important. Yet such a 
denial is quite standard.160 
Art is in general difficult to paraphrase, music even more so. Therefore, it may be 
understandable that we see the external aspect of meaning in music as less relevant than the 
internal. However, just as we can express our understanding of a poem by paraphrasing it, 
recognising that we do not say the same thing that the poem says, and not in the same manner, 
we can express our understanding of a musical work by describing it in, for instance, either 
emotional or music-analytical terms. “[I]n offering to paraphrase the poem, one is not offering 
to replace it with something just as good, or even with something of the same sort. One is 
offering merely to express one’s understanding of what the poem says by saying it in a 
different way”.161  
 
If we were presented with two different musical works that both express the quality of 
sadness, we could not change the main themes between them and expect the result to be the 
same. If the transposition was done well, they may still both express sadness, but they would 
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be different works nonetheless.162 Paraphrase would not work in this manner in music. The 
fact that we can describe both of the works as sad, though, shows us how an external 
understanding may have a place in music. There is something in common between the two 
themes, even though they are not interchangeable. And to express this is to express an 
(external) understanding of music. 
In offering descriptions of pieces of music, we highlight qualities in them that 
other pieces of music might share (qualities such as being blithe, or in D major, or 
jig-worthy). We do not suppose that such descriptions can capture or exhaust what 
we have understood internally, any more than we ought to suppose that a 
paraphrase of a poem can exhaust or capture that. But we do suppose that our 
descriptions, the ones we are happy with at least, say something apt and true about 
the music in question; and in supposing this we acknowledge both the fact of our 
external understanding and its role in our understanding of the pieces of music we 
say we understand.163 
For Ridley, then, the understanding of music must, as any kind of understanding, be of both 
kinds, internal and external. In the case of music, the internal part is probably more important 
than the external, however, the external understanding is both possible and important, as long 
as the external understanding is grounded in the internal.  
 
However, it does not seem like Kivy necessarily would have to disagree with this. Kivy’s 
notion of music being expressive of emotion can be seen as a kind of external understanding 
of music. That we hear analogies between the emotive tone of voice or emotive movement 
and music seems to be facilitated by a kind of external understanding. And, for Kivy, this 
kind of external understanding is, in fact, grounded in the internal, as he sees the expressive 
properties of music as emerging from the structural properties. As such, if Ridley’s seeing 
understanding as both external and internal is motivated by wanting to show that the work of 
Kivy (and other philosophers of a similar mould) is exclusively internal, it seems like it fails. 
I believe that the problem here is that Kivy will not fall squarely into any of these categories. 
Ridley conceive of him as expressing merely internal understanding, but from what I can 
                                                 
162 Arguably, the two main themes would express different nuances or shades of sadness to begin with, these 
differences would probably carry over to some degree with the switch of themes between works. 
163 Aaron Ridley, The Philosophy of Music: Theme and Variations, p. 35. 
 
 80 
understand, Kivy’s contour theory is to some degree, at least, also an expression of external 
understanding.  
 
In the end, Ridley is not denying that an internal understanding of music is possible, nor even 
that it is in most cases the best route for understanding music. His point is that the internal 
understanding cannot do work on its own. Understanding anything has two aspects, thus 
understanding music must have two aspects as well. That is all he wants, and as far as the 
theory goes, all he needs. He is not after a reversal in the roles between the two aspects of 
understanding in music, just a recognition that external understanding plays a role as well as 
the internal. He concludes: 
…a deafness to Wittgenstein’s remark about themes and sentences has often led 
philosophers of music to conclude that music, if it is meaningful at all, must be 
meaningful in some purely musical way. But this, we can now see, is either trivial 
or false. It is trivial if it shadows the claim that language, understood internally, is 
meaningful in some purely linguistic way: everything understandable is 
meaningful in that sense (tools toolishly, pictures pictorially – etc.). And it is false 
if it depends on the view that, unlike linguistic understanding, musical 
understanding is internal through and through. … We need to be less confident of 
our theoretical grasp of language, in other words, and more – that is, duly – 
confident of our understanding of music.164 
Contrary to many other contemporary philosophers of music, then, Ridley is eager to make 
the comparison between music and language. Where others do it reluctantly, he does it 
happily. This is because he thinks that if we leave the meaning-atomistic view that (he thinks) 
is prevalent in the philosophy of music today, not only can an analysis of language cast light 
on music, but an analysis of music might cast light on language.  
 
Ultimately, I have my doubts about Ridley’s views. In an analytical setting, many of his 
arguments are too vague to facilitate a proper discussion with the other interlocutors. When I 
have chosen to include him it is because I think that his discussion of absolute music shows us 
a deficiency in how the term is conceived of and used, and because his notion of paraphrase 
helps me explain how the different accounts of musical meaning are related to music. I am 
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ready to accept his discussion of paraphrase on grounds of my own experience of coming to 
understand something. Even if it is not stringently argued for, it resonates with me. 
 
3.3.4 Robinson and Paraphrase 
 
With Ridley’s notion of paraphrase now thoroughly explained I can make good on the 
promise to return to Robinson. There are two points from Robinson I want to look at in light 
of paraphrase, one is regarding plot summaries, and the other my own estimation of 
narrativism. The reasons for why a plot summary is nothing like the aesthetic object itself 
should be even more clear after the discussion of the paraphraseable and the non-
paraphraseable understanding of meaning. Just as a poem is intrinsically non-paraphrasable, a 
musical work is too. Still, to express understanding of a poem, we allow paraphrase, often in 
the form of something like a plot summary. In the case of music, then, a plot summary should 
be no more mysterious. It is not claimed that in paraphrasing the work, retelling the plot in 
words, or in giving a plot summary, we are repeating exactly what the musical work 
expresses. At its core, the musical work is non-paraphraseable. What a plot or a plot summary 
should be seen as doing then, is to try to express understanding of the musical work. 
 
With regards to my own estimation of narrativism, I think it appears stronger if seen in light 
of Ridley’s discussion of paraphrase. Saying that a musical work in some way consists of a 
plot, or that it is narrative in nature, seems to me not to capture the nature of a musical work. 
But seeing narratives as the best way of paraphrasing (with words) the content of a musical 
work seems more plausible. Since describing is usually done with words, and since music is 
more akin to literature than to science, using literary analogies to paraphrase music is 
probably more correct than using scientific analogies. This account seems to let music keep 




As laid out at the start, my aim in this thesis has been fourfold. The main aim was to refute 
claims from Peter Kivy that so-called ““Absolute music,” then, as defined, is pure 
instrumental music without text, title, program, dramatic setting, or any other extra-musical 
apparatus. It is music, as defined, without representational, narrative, semantic or other extra-
musical content”.165 Or, that music is a “quasi-syntactical structure of sound understandable 
solely in musical terms and having no semantic or representational content, no meaning, 
making reference to nothing beyond itself”.166 The second aim was to question the viability of 
the term absolute music. The third aim was to examine the connection between music and the 
emotions, to see if meaning in music and emotions are connected, and what aesthetic 
relevance (if any) emotions have in music. The final aim was to say something positive about 
what meaning in music is. 
 
First, a general remark; while formalism has been the dominant position, especially in music 
criticism through the 20th century, it seems that the tide is about to turn. This may be due in 
large part to the empirical evidence that indicates that music does in fact arouse emotion in 
listeners. It may of course be the case that the experiments are badly carried out, or that the 
emotion aroused is of no aesthetic significance, but results of that kind will no doubt 
encourage philosophers of music to continue exploring the arousal of emotion by music. 
 
The above claims from Kivy deny that music has meaning, not only in a linguistic sense, but 
in many other significant senses of the word meaning as well. I have shown in this thesis that 
the claim that music has no semantic meaning holds. This is the only sense that Kivy allows 
for meaning in connection with music. Stated like this, I have to agree that there is no 
meaning in music. However, I have shown as well that music alone, absolute music, so 
conceived, still in many cases is capable of making reference to something beyond itself. 
Works of pure music can, through the arousal of emotion, give us psychological insights, as 
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166 Peter Kivy, Music Alone, p. 202. 
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argued by Young. He also shows that music is capable of illustrative representation. Robinson 
can, with the help of Ridley, show how works of music can plausibly be conceived of as 
narratives. Thus, I have argued that both of Kivy’s definitions of absolute music are wrong, 
since music is capable of representation and can be heard as narratives. 
 
Furthermore, I have pointed out that the widespread use of absolute music as examples in the 
philosophy of music is troublesome. Ridley has shown that the notion of absolute music 
seems like a theoretical construct that is not capable of capturing the nature of music. While it 
works for the specific aim of showing that music does not convey linguistic meaning, it 
overlooks relevant parts of what music is. Kivy’s definition stipulates that absolute music 
does not have narrative, representational or semantic content. This is more than a descriptive 
definition. While he claims this is the common understanding of absolute music, his 
adversaries do not agree. I agree that there are works of music that can be considered absolute 
as per Kivy’s definition, however, these are few; far fewer than Kivy believes. A better, 
descriptive understanding of the term would be just the first half of his definition, that 
absolute music is music without extra-musical apparatus. 
 
There is broad agreement that there is a connection between music and emotions. Kivy 
believes that the only connection between music and emotions that can be heard in music is 
music being expressive of emotion, like a St. Bernard being expressive of sadness. I have 
shown that the connection goes deeper than this. Surveys of empirical evidence made by 
Young reveal that music reliably arouses emotion in the listener. Both Young and Robinson 
base parts of their accounts of musical meaning on this fact. Hence, at least some of the 
meaning we find in music is due to the connection between music and the emotions. When it 
comes to the aesthetic relevance of the emotions, the picture is a little less clear. Kivy has an 
interesting view, in that the only emotion he believes music is capable of arousing, comes as a 
result if correctly attending to great music as an aesthetic object. As such, the only role 
aroused emotion plays in music is of aesthetic relevance. However, his failure to consider the 
wide range of emotion experienced by listeners makes this conclusion weaker. Young is 
unable to sufficiently account for how emotions are relevant to our enjoyment of music, and 
the psychological insight he believes we gain from music may only be attainable from a small 
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range of works. Robinson believes that the arousal of both primitive emotions and cognitively 
complex emotions play a part in us hearing musical works as narratives. In contributing to the 
overall (narrative) structure of the work, emotions are relevant to our aesthetic enjoyment of 
music. 
 
Lastly, I wanted to point in the direction of a theory of meaning in music. I hope that this 
picture has become clear in the course of the thesis.  
The three differing accounts of what is meaningful in music centres around three different 
kinds of analogies. Robinson makes an analogy between music and narratives, Young 
between music and illustration and Ridley between music and language. If we make a return 
to Hanslick, we may understand why they all speak in analogies when trying to show what 
meaning in music is like. 
Accordingly, by contrast with arabesque, music is actually a picture, but one 
whose subject we cannot grasp in words and subsume under concepts. Music has 
sense and logic – but musical sense and logic. It is a kind of language which we 
speak and understand, yet cannot translate. It is due to a kind of subconscious 
recognition that we speak of musical “thoughts”, and, as in the case of speech, the 
trained judgement easily distinguishes between genuine thoughts and empty 
phrases. In the same way, we recognize the rational coherence of a group of tones 
and call it a sentence, exactly as with every logical proposition we have a sense of 
where it comes to an end, although what we might mean by “truth” in the two 
cases is not at all the same thing.167  
Or, we can look back to Mendelssohn. 
There is so much talk about music, and yet so little really said. For my part I 
believe that words do not suffice for such a purpose, and if I found they did 
suffice, then I certainly would have nothing more to do with music. People often 
complain that music is ambiguous, that their ideas on the subject always seem so 
vague, whereas every one understands words; with me it is exactly the reverse; 
not merely with regard to entire sentences, but also as to individual words; these, 
too, seem to me so ambiguous, so vague, so unintelligible when compared with 
genuine music, which fills the soul with a thousand things better than words. 
What the music I love expresses to me, is not thought too indefinite to be put into 
words, but, on the contrary, too definite.168 
                                                 
167 Eduard Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful, p. 30. 
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What Hanslick and Mendelssohn are, from very different perspectives, highlighting 
here, is that any attempt to try and cash out the meaning of music in words or pictures is 
futile. We simply do not get exactly the same. This is why I think that the notion of 
paraphrase can help us understand what meaning in music is. We must see these 
accounts of musical meaning more as paraphrases, as attempts to offer an understanding 
of music, rather than explanations of what musical meaning is. If we understand that 
Robinson does not think that music is narration, or that Young does not believe that 
music is an illustration, I think their views make more sense. Some of these paraphrases 
will, no doubt be better than others. What I hope to have argued convincingly, then, is 
that at least one kind of meaning in music is best captured in words, by making 
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